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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Civil Rights was one of the most explosive political

issues of the 1960’s.

Race relations was a concern to

everyone r and a special concern to government at all levels
and in all parts of the United States.

This paper will show

how Huntington,. West Virginia, a medium-sized border city

with a small minority population, faced the problem.

In

1962, the Mayor established a Civil Rights Commission which

served to insulate the City Council--the political decision-

makers—from facing and resolving the problems of the Negro

minority.
Politics is understood here as the distribution of
advantages and disadvantages among people.

Individuals

differ in their ability to influence the political system so

that these advantages are distributed unequally, and there
is conflict concerning the allocation of resources.

One way

influence can be used by those advantaged in the system is
by preventing decisional questions from arising or to

restrict the domain of decision choices to those acceptable
to the advantaged.1

1Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swan
son, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1964), p. 133.
1

2
In studying conflicts over the allocation of values,

this case study will use the political system model of Peter

Bachrach and Morton Baratz, for their study of power in the
Baltimore poverty program.

This model points out several

barriers in the channel of policy choices to effective

policy change in the political system.

These barriers to

the decision-making arena result in what Bachrach and Baratz

label nondecisions.2

Nondecision-making is defined as the means by which
demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits
and privileges in a community can be stifled before they

gain access to the relevant decision-making arena.2

Non

decision, as detailed by Bachrach and Baratz, is seen as an
added dimension to the elitist-pluralist views of power and
decision-making in matters of public policy.

they ask is not,

The question

"Who rules," but, rather, "What persons or

groups are especially disfavored under the existing
distribution of benefits and privileges?"

And, concomitantly,

to what extent is a political system maintained that delivers
"unfair shares" in the allocation of values?

This kind of

analysis, they argue, can provide a broader focus for the

2Figure 1, p. 3.
This model of the decision-making
political system follows that of Bachrach and Baratz. Peter
Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 54.
3lbid., p. 44.

4jbid., p. 50 .
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study of power relationships between those who are favored

by the system and those who are at a significant dis

advantage . 5
The first barrier by which demands for change can be
thwarted is the existing community norms and values.

These

provide an automatic mobilization of bias in favor of the
status quo, and are used by both sides of a conflict if it

is to their advantage.

In Huntington, appeals to the

Protestant work ethic prevented any significant gains in
Negro employment opportunities ("they ought to earn their
way"), while the right of private property was raised to

prevent any changes in Negro housing patterns.
The second barrier to change in the model is that of

procedures and institutions that serve to block access to
the decision-making arena.

It is the hypothesis of this

study that the Huntington Commission on Civil Rights
provided an institution of nondecision-making designed to

defuse and neutralize issues so that the City Council would
not have to deal with racial questions in an official

decision-making capacity.

This Commission was specifically

designed to serve as an official agency of nondecision; a
barrier to the political arena of decision-making that might

have provided a reallocation of values favoring a dis
advantaged Negro minority.

5Ibid., p. 51.
6See Figure 1.

Thus, the Commission was unable

5

to effect any positive decisions despite the wishes of some
Commission members to see change that would reorient
community norms and the desire of other members to provide

change in terms of prevailing norms.
This lack of power to effect any kind of change
frustrated the Commission members who pushed for a

modification of their official status from Mayor's Commission
to status by ordinance.

After a year and a half of

discussion the City Council agreed, and this small but

positive decision, affecting system output to the advantage

of a minority, alarmed conservative members of the community
who saw it as a first step from nondecision to decision in a

sensitive area, one in which they were not willing to

disturb the status quo.

These conservatives prevailed upon

the existing bias of the community--the threat of Communism,

taxes, law and order,

ti

get city hall,” property rights,

racial hatred and fears—to win their battle to bring the

ordinance to a referendum vote.

It was defeated by a vote

of two to one, thus successfully forcing this issue out of
the political system—where it has remained.

A case study of the Commission will be used to show
how a community can force issues into a nondecision status

where an advantaged group uses indirect means to exercise
influence on policy outcomes in order not to antagonize its

disadvantaged minority.

In fact, while Civil Rights

Commissions are generally seen as positive steps toward the

settlement of racial problems, this model shows that, far

6

from providing access to the system, such a Commission only

provides reinforcement for the status quo, or change only
within an accepted area limited by existing community norms.

Gordon Allport points out that official Commissions
to combat prejudice often turn into the "Mayor’s Do-Nothing

Committee."

The members are too busy and too untrained to

do much except deplore prejudice.
concretely defined objectives.

There is a lack of

No one can "improve community

relations" in the abstract, for goodwill contact without
concrete goals accomplishes nothing.

Minority groups gain

nothing, he points out, from "artificially induced mutual
7
admiration."
This was the problem in Huntington, but it

was only partly a problem of personnel.

The principal

hindrance was the institution of the Commission outside the

decision-making arena.

^Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New
York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958)r p. 266.

CHAPTER II
TYPOLOGIES :

HUNTINGTON AND THE

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
Huntington, West Virginia, is a city of 73,000

located in central Ohio River Valley, bordering Ohio and
Kentucky.

Huntington is largely a railroad town,

incorporated and named in 1871 by Collis P. Huntington, then

president of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad.

Today, the

C & 0 is still one of the major influences in the city.

Huntington ships the greatest tonnage of any port on the
Ohio River, largely coal.

Transportation is thus the largest

business in Huntington, and it is built on "King Coal," the

chief economic power in the state.
During the twentieth century, several manufacturing
concerns have located plants in the area, largely because of
the transportation network, the marketing location, or the

accessibility of natural resources such as coal, natural gas,
water, or what a local Chamber of Commerce brochure terms

"native-born, intelligent, self-reliant labor."

Huntington

also serves as a market and service area for the surrounding
tri-state area of approximately 500,000 people, so that

retail business and the professions are active in the

community.

Marshall University provides the main source of

community growth as it has more than doubled its building

7

8

capacity and enrollment during the past ten years.

Today,

1971, about 10,000 students are enrolled.
The population is basically white Anglo-Saxon

Protestant with a small Lebanese family clan that have
Huntington as their headquarters.

There is a small Negro

community comprising about 5 percent of the total city
population.

This percentage has remained stable despite the

loss of approximately 10,000 people in each of the last two

census periods--a pattern that has prevailed throughout the

state, especially in the very depressed southern coalfield
counties.

Perhaps this declining population is the reason
there are not more of the highly mobile people who are so
prevalent in urban areas in much of the United States.

Those

who do come in transfer to a management position in a local
plant of a national companyr join the Marshall University
faculty, or serve a period as manufacturer's representatives.
The Chamber of Commerce calls Huntington the "Northern city

of the South," and the ideology as well as many of the folk

ways are more Southern than Northern.

The only employer

that is still in the process of expansion in the city is the
University, but University personnel, especially those that

are new and young, are generally insulated from the community

when they first arrive, and then leave before they have a

chance to become involved in community concerns.

This

initial insulation is true of any newcomer to this
conservative community, but seems especially true of

9

University people who are often more interested in
University politics than in city politics.

Huntington is generally considered a stable

community in which 65 percent of the people own their own
home s.

There are 176 churches in the city with a membership

of 55,000.

Often, the first question a newcomer hears is

not the usual where do you work, or where do you come from,
but, instead, where do you go to church?

Is is not

considered, by most people, a town oriented toward innovation
or change.

However, in the 1950’3 there was a flurry of civic
activity that resulted, in 1958, in Look magazine naming and

chronicling Huntington as one of its All-America Cities.

Ten years earlier, said Look, this largest city in the state
(92,000)1 had suffered from galloping provincialism.

Since

1948, the PTA’s have led four campaigns to replace the forty
one-room schools in the county; civic groups had promoted

the building of four racially integrated swimming pools;
$600,000 had been raised for an art gallery; a doctor’s

committee had led a campaign for a three million dollar bond
issue to build a hospital while another bond issue built an
airport.

(This was the last time bond issues were used for

any civic improvements.

There is no bonding in the school

system which proudly states its pay-as-you-go policy.)

But,

continued Look, inept city government was in deep financial

11950 census figure.

10

trouble with $228,000 in unpaid bills, and the superin
tendent of streets under indictment for misuse of public
monies.

This financial chaos inspired the All-Huntington

Association, spearheaded by the League of Women Voters, to
lead a campaign to convince the voters to adopt CouncilManager government.

"Today, Huntington is moving from chaos

to a new era. „2

The new era of 1958 has become the status quo of

today.

This reform coalition of middle-class clubwomen and

businessmen felt that government by professionals would

solve their problems--that of government by inept and
politically-inspired persons—and replace it with persons
who held the same reverence for efficient and business-like

government, removed from the arena of partisan politics.

o

Groups such as the All-Huntington Association have
been characterized in one study as "community conservationists.”

According to this analysis, such groups see

2Look (February 17, 1959) , 80 .
3The All-Huntington Association still elects a City
Council slate that carefully reflects the dominant reform
ideology. Despite an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, mainly
from those more favored under the old system, or from those
who hold a more conservative view of the role of government,
the All-Huntington Association has elected every Council
since the inception of Council-Manager government in 1957.

There was one challenge to this reign in 1964, when a
group of dissidents successfully petitioned for a new charter
board in a dispute over taxes, and the unpopular city
manager. A new charter was written—the strong Mayor-Council
form--but was narrowly defeated at the polls, by fewer than
fifty votes.
A new charter board was elected which modified
the charter to include Councilmanic districts, but with the

11

government as the most important institution for producing
good community values.

Their cultural values stress

improved public schools and planned and guided development

of land.

They desire to operate in a spirit of harmonious

cooperation on the part of the citizenry; they value civic

pride, a strong sense of public spirit, and an efficientr
corruption-free city government.

The "community conservationists" are often joined by

the "progressive conservatives"

(as they were in Huntington).

This group accepts government as one of the legitimate

mechanisms of resource distribution along with that of

private institutions.

They often see their rule as benev-

olent and in the best interest of the whole community.

The administrators and civic leaders who constitute

these two groups believe that "democracy has become
institutionalized in the civic improvement process because

open hearings are held on proposals; an advisory committee
system recruits the normal leadership to help plan and

manage civic improvements; and the public administrators
involved are available at specific times and places to hear

complaints or give information."^

Councilmen still elected at-large on a non-partisan ballot
ensuring that only those candidates that can successfully
appeal to the whole city may win.
^Robert E. Aggerr Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E.
Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1964), p. 29.

5lbid., pp. 669-70.

12

Council-Manager government with non-partisan, atlarge elections establishes a political decision-making

system that fulfills the model of nondecision by carefully
screening the kinds of demands that are permitted to enter

the system by the usual channels.

A City Manager form of

government, coupled with prevailing values of "good govern-

ment," consensus, economy, and efficiency seriously limits
the kind of decisions considered legitimate.

Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler studied policy

outputs of reform cities and found that reformist govern

ments mitigate against particularistic interests and refuse
to recognize that persistent cleavages may exist in the
f!

electorate.

Non-partisanship reflects a highly integrated

community life with a powerful capacity to induce conformity."

Moreover, reformed institutions often demand an

impersonal, apolitical settlement of conflict;8 this was the

role the Human Rights Commission in Huntington was to play.
The Lineberry-Fowler study follows the model of nondecision
in that "reformed, bureaucratized, and 1de-politicized1 city

administrators lessened the access of groups that were

^Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism
and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political
Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 702. Reformism is
seen as an attempt to "rationalize" and "democratize" city
government by the substitution of community-oriented leader
ship rather than that built on competing particularistic
interests.
7Ibid.

8Ibid.

13
segregated by residential areas or other identifiable voting

blocs, so that interest was articulated by some other agency
or not at all. u9

Banfield and Wilson studied the policy outputs of
several cities and found that "Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle

class ethos—a view of the world which sees politics as a

means of moralizing life and the obligation of an individual
to serve the public’’--assumed that there existed a public

interest that pertained to the city as a whole and that this
interest should always prevail over competing, partial

interests.

ii

Interference in the management of public affairs.

especially attempts to assert private or partial interests

against the public interests, would not be tolerated. 10
According to this typology, a group such as the

Human Rights Commission is doomed before it starts insofar
as it might introduce any meaningful change into the system;

for its reason for existing was to effect change in the field
of civil rights in favor of very particular interests.

It

would be difficult to convince most citizens of Huntington
that their best interest lay in furthering the interests of a

disadvantaged minority; and when City Council at last
decided to offer a symbolic gesture, the citizenry would not
even allow that.

9Ibid., P- 715.
l^Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965),
pp. 139-40.

1
14
The Banfield-Wilson study found also that non-

partisanship (a part of the reform structure) tended to
force the candidates to avoid controversial issues.

"They

are elected on the basis of whatever sources of power or
symbols of legitimacy may be dominant in the community; and

their policies tend to express the interests and values
associated with those symbols.

^--^Timothy Hennessey undertakes a critique of Banfield
and Wilson’s ethos theory in which he attacks the "unclear
nature of the formulation [which] permitted the values of
the individual investigator to enter into the research at
the verification stage." He also finds that the ethos
theory proceeds from the rather "misleading assumption that
urban cleavages coalesce around two simplistic conceptions
of the public interest, that of middle-class good government
public-regarding interest, and the immigrant ethos of
particular interests." Hennessey points out that this
concept of public-regarding versus the private-regarding
interest is contingent upon some theory of the public
interest, which, he claims, is never really presented to
test the theory of ethos. Hennessey also finds difficulty
with the issues chosen by Banfield and Wilson to determine
public or private interest.
Lineberry and Fowler are castigated for their
addition of the process model to the ethos theory in which
they make statements such as "the higher the level of
Reformism, the less responsive the governmental structures
to these conflicts and private-regarding demands." He
accuses this study of using type concepts without defining
variables.

Both the ethos theory and the research of Lineberry
and Fowler indicate that reform structures in city government
will tend to insulate the decision-making arena from demands
of particularistic groups with special interests. Hennessey
claims that these studies offer no theory of elite decision
making to see how these decisions are made.
It is precisely
this objection that is overcome by tying the ethos theory to
a nondecision model in this study.
The barriers to decision
making in the model provide the kind of insulation from
private interests that these studies discuss.
It is our
contention that a nondecision model explains why a reformist

15
Reformed city government structures thus establish

barriers to the decision-making system.

Competing groups do

not elect men that represent their views who then fight out

their conflicts in the decision-making arena of city council.
Instead the council is elected at-large, without party
labels.

This means, in practice, that councilmen must gain

backing from the reform group and be slated in order to be

elected.

The reformers in Huntington retain their good

government image so that any opposition group must run
against the forces of good as well as the individuals
running for the council seats.
In Huntington, the reformers have generally had the

support of the community at large because the reform
ideology has not differed to any significant degree from

that of the majority of its citizens.

The reformers see

themselves operating as the guardian of the community, a

guardian who is prudent, benevolent, and wise.

In this

environment community consensus becomes a necessary pre
requisite to decision-making.

What constitutes the public

good must either be agreed upon by a majority of the

citizenry or else the people must perceive the leadership as
capable of divining the public good for them.

As Auerbach

and Walker found:

government is insulated from any but consensus demands.
Timothy M. Hennessey, ’’Problems in Concept Formulation: The
’Ethos Theory’ and the Comparative Study of Urban Politics,”
Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIV (November, 1970) ,
537-647 " ————————————

i
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It is difficult to devise policies which can
solve social problems, and still more difficult to
build coalitions which can enact these policies and
support their enforcement. Democratic governments
which wish to build trust must also convince the
public that policies are the result of consultation
and citizen participation, that the opinions of
average people matter, and that individuals will
receive a fair hearing from public officials.!2
This study found that political trust must be very high in

order for government decision-making institutions to legis
late in favor of minorities.

In a consensus decision

making system conflict is not considered desirable and
necessary; dissident groups are somehow not viewed as working

in the public interest but "out for their own good."

The

structure of the Council-Manager system serves to close off

conflict before it reaches the decision-making stage of the
political system so that only consensus decisions or nondecisions can occur.

Since the dominant political structure valued con-

sensus, this was the primary focus of the Commission.
secondary focus was to fill the hearing role.

A

In no way

could the Commission innovate outside the accepted norms of

the dominant consensus ideologyr although the leadership (the
community conservationists) was willing to try to modify
community attitudes to agree with its own.

For instance, in the field of Civil Rights, the city

leadership was more ready than the rest of the community to

12Joel D. Auerbach and Jack L. Walker, "Political
Trust and Racial Ideology," Ame
_ rican Political Science
Review, LXIV (December, 1970), 1217.

17
acknowledge the force of national and state laws in the

field, for they found that "what appears to be Constitutional
law at the Supreme Court level becomes, in part, local
politics at the level of community response."

This

"community response level" accounts for the eventual local

reaction against the work of the Commission despite higher
governmental levels of authority that could act in the place

of the local Commission if the local group did not function.
In other words, the city leadership was less likely

than the community to fight the inevitable product of the
larger political system over which they had no control and
little influence.

The leadership was likely to comply

immediately on a token basis or offer little local enforce
ment rather than rail against unpopular gains made by the

Civil Rights movement nationwide.

In fact, whatever motives

actually prompted its creation, the Human Rights Commission
in Huntington served to ally the city government on the
positive side of the racial issue while making no actual

changes and giving up no real decisions.

The structure of the decision-making system of local
government in Huntington and the norms of those people who

were active during the decade of the 1960’3 served to work
toward consensus within an accepted paradigm.

This set up

13James R. Klonski and Robert I. Mendelsohn, "The
Allocation of Justice: A Political Approach," The Politics
of Local Justice, Klonski and Mendelsohn, eds. (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 4.

18
the local government process so that only those decisions

that had already achieved legitimacy were apt to be offered
on racial issues.
The Civil Rights Commission in Huntington was

structured by proclamation of the Mayor, as were many other

citizen advisory groups.

His proclamation of June, 1962,

charged this Commission to work "for the elimination of
discriminatory practices and policies in our community

arising out of race, creed or national origin."

Said Mayor

John Durkin:
It is my hope that this Commission acting without
any fanfare or undue publicity and with patience and
goodwill will play a vital role in bringing about
understandings and adjustments to the end that there
may be elimination of all discriminatory practices.
In this sensitive area it is my belief that private
discussions can accomplish more toward erasing
lingering prejudices than can laws and public
agitation.14

This proclamation seems to embody the ground rules for an
effective nondecision-making group; patience and goodwill
are not tools designed to force controversial decisions.
The Mayor may have been influenced by a letter from

Mr. John Kohlbecker, Chairman of the Mayor’s Commission on

Human Relations in Charleston, West Virginia, who sent this
advice:
I think you have taken a fine first step forward,
and if you pick the right men and women, they should
accomplish a lot. . . .

14john Durkin, Proclamation Establishing a Mayor’s
Commission on Civil Rights, June, 1962.
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1. The Commission should be appointed by the
Mayor and not be approved by Council.
It should not
have any authority.
Some of our members would like
to have official status, but most of us think this
would be a mistake, because we cannot afford to have
any controversy in the Council as to whether or not
the Commission should operate. Here in Charleston,
our Commission is viewed by the public as having full
authority, and that is the way we want to keep it.
We believe in persuasion, not force.15
Mr. Kohlbecker concludes:

At present our position is that we do not favor sitins, stand-ins, or picketing. We feel that the
colored people should work through the Commission.
Thus far we have been successful; but, if you have
not already found it out, you will learn that your
big problem will be with the colored people, more so
than with the white. There is quite a bit of
jealousy within their ranks, and they like the idea
of these public demonstrations. Each one wants to
take the credit for any advances made in integration.
I have taken a forthright and forceful stand on this
matter, and up to this time I have been able to
prevail upon our colored people that their ultimate
best interests lie in cooperating with the
Commission, and not trying to make its work more
difficult through these public demonstrations
which . . . can do nothing but harm. When the colored
people rely on the Commission to produce results, then
the Commission must sincerely . . . move ahead to
attain its objectives. Of course, I realize that when
persuasion will not move our white people then the
Commission will need the help of something more
positive (such as demonstrations) . . . but only as a
last resort.
Personally, as long as our Commission is
accomplishing what it is here in our city, I will not
tolerate such public demonstrations. My word to the
colored people is simply this: Either go along and
cooperate with the Commission, or do it their own way,
and when they do not want to follow the Commission,
then our Commission should be disbanded.15

15Letter, L. L. Kohlbecker, Chairman of the Mayor's
Commission on Human Relations, Charleston, West Virginia, to
Mr. John Durkin, Mayor, City of Huntington, West Virginia,
May 25, 1962.
16Ibid.

20

Certainly this benevolent view of the work of the Commission

would reinforce the ideology of the community leadership in

Huntington since it was built on a consensus model within

accepted community values.

In Gordon Allport’s study of prejudice in the
United States, he viewed many such Commissions and similar
committees.

He pointed out:

It has sometimes been held that merely by assembling
people without regard for race, color, religion or
national origin, we can thereby destroy stereotypes
and develop friendly attitudes. The case is not so
simple.17

And the Guideline for Bi-Racial Committees, a handbook
designed for groups working in the area of Civil Rights
explains:

The idea that large numbers of people of any group
can be controlled or managed through ’leaders’ is
a myth.
People can be aroused or calmed or led to
rational or irrational forms of behavior through
direct communication and appeal to their emotions
or their reason. A committee of prominent, respected,
and wise people representative of various groups . . .
can decide what to communicate and how to communicate;
their mere presence and participation on a committee
does little to influence the behavior of what is pre
sumed to be their following.18
These Guidelines warn against the agency conceived of as the
"receiver of complaints" or the "repair service behind the
scenes”; yet this was exactly the role the Huntington

-^Gordon
Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New
York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 9.

18George Schermer, Guidelines: A Manual for BiRacial Committees (New York: Anti-Defamation League of
B’nai B’rith, 1964), p. 16.
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Commission on Civil Rights was expected to play.^-9
The Huntington Commission was composed of persons

known to be sympathetic to the cause of Civil Rights.

The

Commission operated as an integral part of the network of
advisory groups that the Council-Manager structure devises

to provide legitimacy as well as suggestions to the decision
making body, the City Council.

The membership was made up of

the "normal" leadership usually appointed to such Commissions
except that professional level Negroes were appointed because

of the special nature of the Commission.
The original appointees to the Commission included

thirteen persons, four Negro and nine white.

The Negroes

included a minister of a Baptist church, a teacher, a service

mechanic at a local industrial plant, and the wife of a
The whites included a Protestant minister; two

dentist.

housewives, one Unitarian and one Jewish; two Jewish

businessmen; two second echelon business managers; the then

Mayor, George L. Garner, as an ex-officio member; and a
representative of the Huntington District Labor Council, a
Catholic.

Later a Negro lawyer and several Negro ministers

rotated off and on the Commission, as did Negro teachers and

a Negro dentist.

There were always representatives of labor,

business, the Protestant clergy, the Jewish and Catholic

communities, and, after the initial appointments, representation from Marshall University.

19lbid., p. 17.

In 1965, the Commission

1
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devised the following statement on its membership policies:

Membership on the Commission should have as broad
a basis as possible, representing different segments
of our community.
In so far as possible, we believe
that it is advantageous to have some members of the
Commission who have status and a following in the
community. We recognize the importance of adequate
racial and religious representation on the Commission
as well as representatives of differing economic
segments of Huntington. We believe ’new blood’ should
be periodically brought into the Commission, but that
all members should have a basic commitment to the
importance of our task.20

Thus the members of the Huntington Commission

followed the pattern of civic leadership in race relations

outlined by Peter B. Clark.

In his study of civic leader

ship , Clark found that public policy in the race relations

field was of special concern to only one set of civic
leaders.

They tended not to be the most influential,

wealthy or prestigious leaders, but Jewish, Catholic or Negro
businessmen or lawyers, or second-level corporation

executives.

Big businessmen tended to stay away from this

area because it was controversial.

Most work of such groups

was done behind the scenes through private discussions with

employers, politicians , and others whose cooperation was
wanted.

Huntington had therefore established a Civil Rights
Commission composed of well-meaning people who recognized

20 Minutes of the Huntington Commission on Civil
Rightsr October 12, 1965. Hereafter referred to as
Commission Minutes.
21peter B. Clark, ’’Civic Leadership: The Symbols of
Legitimacy, If quoted in Banfield and Wilson, pp. 248-49.
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that there was a racial problem in Huntington and who hoped
to be able to do something about it, a Commission whose
failure was due to lack of tools to carry out its task since

it was given no implements but the power of persuasion to
try to influence either community norms and bias or public
policy outputs.

1

CHAPTER III

THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION
The impetus to set up a local Commission to work in

the area of race relations came from the State Commission on

Human Rights, established in 1961 by legislative act.
Although given no enforcement powers, the State Commission

was able to make some agreements concerning nondiscriminatory practices, especially in the area of public
accommodations.

In 1961, the state legislature had

recognized that the racial issue was becoming more viable

nationwide and thought the state had better be prepared to

deal with it.
In its annual report for 1962, the State Commission

outlined the environment in which it worked:
It must be recognized that important changes took
place within the Negro community as a result of the
intensive campaign last May in Birmingham. The use
of police dogs and high pressure hoses in efforts to
suppress the demonstrations brought a tremendous out
cry of protest from citizens across the nation. This
outrage solidified the Negro community into new
determination. There is no longer much of any
argument regarding pickets, sit-ins, and other mass
demonstrations. These techniques of protest are now
accepted as a part of the nessary activity. No
voice who counsels patience, gradualism or delay has
any hearing within the Negro community. The word is
NOW. Leadership and initiative are being seized by
the young, . . .

The mood of change which has reached all sections
of the country has in many ways totally altered the
24

25

situation in which we work and the framework in which
we seek to find new patterns. All past accomplish
ments are not enough. The burning issue is only what
lies ahead to be accomplished.
It is a context of a revolution in the making.

.

1

This report went on to indicate that the main thrust of the

State Commission ’s work in its first year was to set up
municipal commissions around the state such as the one in
Huntington.

o

The report explains:

It is clear that a local human rights commission
can make a valuable contribution to the furthering
of human rights and interracial understanding. How
ever, in order to do so, the city councilr in making
the appointment, needs not only to believe in the
desirability of change, but also to be committed to
the eradication of discriminatory practices.3
The state report neglected to mention the tools with
which a local commission would be expected to work or the
consensus necessary to transform change in ideas into change

in practice.

For, as one student has indicated, the Negro

is not suddenly becoming a protagonist of change.
always been a symbol of change.

He has

Every major change in the

status and role of the Negroe in the past has been a
reflection of important modifications in other parts of the

social system.

"The objectives of every movement for change

^Annual Report, West Virginia Human Rights
Commission, Charleston, West Virginia, 1962-63, p. 4.
(The
State of West Virginia operates on a July 1 fiscal year, and
this is the ending and beginning date of the report.)
Charleston, Clarksburg, and Parkersburg were the
only municipalities in the state that had local commissions
in the spring of 1962 when the state agency began its efforts.

^Annual Report, 1962-63, p. 15 .
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. have in common the fact that they represent interests

and values that have failed to find full recognition in the

existing power and status system.

H4

George Schermer indicates that there are two
generally accepted views of Human Relations Committees
The first holds that government should be the
regulator; that it should adopt laws and promulgate
regulation which define fair practices, prohibit
discrimination and require compliance, The agency
is then established to administer the law. The
agency is empowered to coerce due process.5

National Civil Rights legislation and West Virginia state

law after 1967 fall into this category.

So would the Human

Rights Commission in Charleston after 1968, when a fair

housing law was passed in that city.

This type of

Commission is a result of decision-making in the political

process.

If a group or individual is opposed to this

decision, the only recourse at this point is to seek to
employ weak people on the staff, limit the finances so that

the Commission is unable to operate, or otherwise work for
the non-implementation of the legislation.

In this way it

is possible to turn a decision into a nondecision by forcing
the Commission to operate at a disadvantage.

On the state

level, the Human Rights Commission was consistently hindered

4m. Elaine Burgess, "Race Relations and Social
Change," The South in Continuity and Change, John C.
McKinney and Edgar T. Thompson, eds. (Durham, N. C.: Duke
University Press, 1965), pp. 338-40; quotation at 340.

5George Schermer, Guidelines: A Manual for Bi—
Racial Committees (New York: Anti-Defamation League of B’nai
B’rith, 1964), p. 21.
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by budgetary limitations in the number of field staff it was
able to hire to investigate complaints.

It was not until

1971 that the State Commission was given a large enough

budget to hire its own lawyer to take depositions and
conduct hearings.
The second view of a Human Relations Commission

holds that the very essence of good human relations is
the meeting of minds, mutual understanding, and
cooperative action. This relationship cannot be
established if an element of coercion is present, A
governmental agency should serve as a promoter and
expediter of communication and provide the forum in
which parties can meet.6
This second view was the one that materialized in the Civil
Rights Commission in Huntington.

It assumes consensus and

no change in the existing system of values, for cooperative
action without coercion implies operation within existing
structures and norms, a nondecision situation.

The argument normally given to support setting up
the latter style Commission is that "you can’t legislate

against prejudice."

Allport effectively counters this by

pointing out that such legislation is not basically aimed at

prejudice at all, but is intended to equalize advantages and

lessen discrimination.

The establishment of a legal norm

creates a public conscience and a standard for expected

behavior that can check overt signs of prejudice.

Thus, the

legislation aims not at controlling prejudice, but only its

6Ibid., P- 22 .
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public expression.

7

Now if discrimination is the accepted

practice in a community, this kind of legislation aims at

causing overt change, a change in the publicly accepted

norms of behavior, or in terms of the model, a decision
output that will attempt real change in existing community
practice.

In a border state like West Virginia or a
municipality like Huntington with a very small Negro

population, the color line exists by tacit agreement instead

'of law.

Negroes were denied equal access to many parts of

the public arena that white citizens took for granted; they

were restricted to the lower levels of industrial occupation;

they were seldom ever allowed to enter the white-only area
of management; they were restricted to a specific residential

area; and they were generally excluded from private circles
of white association.

In comparison to the deep South, there

was less overt hostility and denigration, less conventional
prejudice, but this merely made whites less aware of the

color line while Negroes felt it just as keenly. 8

This

general description of the color line in the North could
have been written specifically about Huntington in the early

sixties.
Census data for 1960 gives some interesting statistics

^Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New
York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 437.
^Herbert Blumer, "The Future of the Color Line," The
South in Continuity and Change, p. 328 .
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about the status of Negroes in the state of West Virginia

and the city of Huntington; these data tend to substantiate
the existence of a color line.

In West Virginia as a whole,
■

non-whites held only two-thirds their "share" of professional

technical positions; only one-fifth of their share of

proprietary and managerial positions; and just over a third

of their share of craftsmen and foremen’s jobs.

But they

had five times their share of service jobs and a much larger
overshare of unskilled employment.
One might expect this situation to be better in the

cities where there is more opportunity, but in Huntington,
Negroes held only 30 percent of the Negro share of

professional positions; there were 19 percent as many Negro

businessmen; 23 percent as many salesmen; and 60 percent as

many craftsmen and foremen in the Negro population as

compared to percentages for the white population.

But there

were 5.4 as many service workers, three times as many

laborers, and about twice the number of unlisted occupations
as there would have been had Negroes occupied their equitable

share of the job categories based on population.
The figures for earnings showed similar disadvantages.

Median family income in Huntington in 1960 was

$5r426 for whites and $3,063 for non-whites.

The figures

for housing indicate 1,446 non-white housing units, with

fewer than 40 percent owner occupied.

Rent was less than

$30 per month in 85 of these households; 45 owner-occupied

1
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places were valued at less than $5,000.

More than one-sixth

i

of all non-white homes in Huntington were classed as
dilapidated.
It was in this kind of environment that Mayor Durkin

created the Civil Rights Commission.

Most of the appoint-

ments were made by his successor as Mayor, George Garner,
who was probably the Commission’s most faithful supporter on

the Council.

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Much of the early work of the Commission in Huntington

was done under the advice of Harold McKinney, Executive
Director of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission.

The

foremost concerns at the time were the opening of employment

opportunities and equal treatment in public accommodations.

Some immediate emphasis was put on public accommodations
because of the West Virginia centennial celebration in 1963

and the hope that many people would be visiting in the state
for its various events.

This led to involvement in behind-the-scenes talks

with hotel and restaurant owners in Huntington who were not
eager to change their established practice.

Often it was

enough to assure the owners that this particular group of

citizens thought that equal service would not hurt their
business (judiciously pointing out the few Negroes who

^Gazette-Mail (Charleston, West Virginia), August 20,
1967, p. 1C.
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actually lived in the city) or to rely on the higher moral
arguments that it was the right thing to do.

Most eating

establishments were willing to give verbal assurance that
they would serve anyonet but were unwilling to display the
State Commission decal that would tell patrons of their nondiscriminatory policy.

During the first year of the

Commission’s work, all the major downtown hotels and motels

were termed "open."^^
Bailey's Cafeteria

There were, however, two cases of outright resistance

in which the Commission found it difficult to convince the

owners to desegregate.

The first involved the president of

the Food Operators Association, Floyd Walker, owner of

Bailey's Cafeteria, a Huntington "institution”; the
restaurant has regularly been recommended to newcomers,
transients, and friends.

Mr. Walker was adamant in his

stand against serving Negroes, despite the Commission's

efforts.

The Commission probably would have continued in

its behind-the-scenes talks indefinitely except for the

intervention of a group that was not bound by the established
procedures of the political process.
A group of Marshall University students, under the

leadership of a popular Negro basketball player, Phil Carter,
and an articulate Negro journalism major, Pat Austin, decided

^Commission Minutesr May 21, 1963.
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to picket Bailey’s in May of 1963.

Mr. Walker was outraged

at the picketing and sit-ins; after closing his restaurant
to keep out the group (known as the Civic Interest Pro

gressives r CIP) , he went to court to obtain an injunction to
deny the CIP’s entry to the restaurant and limit their
number and style of picketing.

This served to bring the

issue of discrimination out into the open in Huntington and

forced the Civil Rights Commission and the City Council to
deal with the issue publicly.

It also served to increase the

conciliatory efforts of the Commission as the demonstrations
became excellent newspaper copy.

Judge John Hereford denied the injunction with a
ringing statement:

. . . during this Centennial year, in a state that
was born as a result of slavery, it seems impossible
that all citizens could not be able to eat in a public
restaurant. Certainly this court is not going to
uphold a practice that injures some of its citizens. 11
This statement served as a public rebuke to Mr. Walker.

After the failure of the injunction petition, Dr.
Royce McDonald confined to meet with Mr. Walker to work out
a compromise.

Several members of the Commission as well as

other civic leaders, visited Mr. Walker urging him to

desegregate.

Many used the argument that there were few

Negroes who would patronize that sort of middle-class
establishment, others said that the publicity was worse than

the projected patronage and pointed out that there was really

^Huntington Herald-Advertiser r May 12, 1963, pp. 1, 4.
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no other restaurant like it in Huntington to take away his

business.

A young lawyer told him it was inevitable/

legally, and he might as well comply gracefully. 12
During the three-week period from the start of the

demonstrations through the working out of the compromise,

there was much agitation in the community about the demonstrations.

Several groups undertook

t!

symbolic" efforts. 13

The Huntington City Council issued a statement which said,

in part:
It is the position of the City Council that all public
or semi-public facilities be open to all persons with
out regard to race, color, or creed. Your City Council
will continue to work diligently with all groups to
achieve this objective.14

The Huntington Ministerial Association passed a resolution:
[We]. . . deplore the attitude of Bailey’s Restaurant
in denying usual service to certain citizens of our
community because of their race, and the Association
urges that the restaurant open to everyone.15

The Executive Director of the West Virginia Human Rights

Commission stated that the refusal by Bailey’s to serve Negroes
was "giving the whole state a kind of a bad reputation." 16

l2Interviews, Paul Pancake, February 15r 1971; John
Jenkins, May 7, 1971.

i3Usage of the term "symbolic" or "symbolic reassur
ance" follows that established by Murray Edelman, The
Symbolie Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1967).
l^Huntington Herald Dispatch, May 11, 1963f P. 1.
l^Huntington Herald-Advertiser, May 12, 1963, p. 3.
l^Huntington Herald Dispatch, May 5, 1963/ p. 1.
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The Huntington Commission was pressured by the CIP
group to give some kind of support to their efforts.

Before

the Bailey’s picketingr the CIP attended a Commission
meeting and discussed their position.

They asked for

Commission supportr but the Chairman told them that public
support would not be wise; that "in order for a local

Commission to negotiate, channels of communication must
remain open; this might not be possible under circumstances

such as picketing.”

He was asked by Phil Carter if the

Commission could then be called neutral, and Rev. McDonald

answered that, although the action might be different, the
ultimate aims were the same.

17

Mr. McKinney, the Executive Director of the State
Commission, said that he was not against student demonstrations as they were sometimes the very thing to galvanize

action.

He felt that such demonstrations were likely to

make the job of the Commission easier rather than more

difficult.18

During the picketing, the Commission offered

this public statement regarding its position on the CIP
demonstrations:
Members of the Commission have visited with Mr.
Floyd Walker of Bailey’s Cafeteria with the hope of
persuading him to open accommodations of the cafeteria
to all racial groups. At the time of the ’share-in’
and picketing, the Commission was still in conversation
with Mr. Walker about his policy of refusing to serve
Negroes.

17Commission Minutes, March 19, 1963.
18Ibid.
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The Commission recognizes the right of groups and
individuals to picket and use other non-violent methods
of protesting various forms of discrimination such as
refusal to serve Negroes in public accommodations.

Further, the Commission stands ready to act as
conciliator in the controversy at Bailey’s, or any other
area of public accommodation or employment . . . where
its services might be utilized.
All of these statements offer what Edelman calls
”symbolic reassurance.”

They provide public statements of

sympathy without changing the actual facts of the issue at
all, except insofar as the persons involved are moved by

publicity.
Symbolic reassurance is a method of nondecision-

making, one that brought results in this case for, within a
week, Dr. McDonaldr Phil Carter, and Mr. Walker worked out a

compromise that would allow Dr. McDonald to bring Charles

Smith, a young Negro ministerr with him to lunch.

After

this, the picketing would stop and there would be no mass
influx of Negro patronsr but they could come in small groups

at different times.

There was to be no publicity.

Despite the great publicity given the picketing,

there was no public announcement of a change in Bailey’s

policy.

Mr. Smith was served, and over the next few months,

several professional-level Negroes went to lunch at Bailey’s
with their white colleagues.
How much did the Commission members ’ efforts have to

19statement of Position, Huntington Commission on
Civil Rights, May 10, 1963, from the private files of Royce
McDonald.
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do with Floyd Walker’s changing his mind?

Dr. McDonald

thinks that all the credit should go to Phil Carter.

If he

hadn’t brought the pressure, Mr. Walker would not have
changed his mind, he speculates.

He sees his own role

merely as midwife, working out a face-saving solution for
,

4-1,

• 1

both sides.

20

Roger Gross, a retail merchant and another

Commission member who talked to Mr. Walker, thinks that Mr.

Walker’s main concern was his business; that he determined a

continuation of the demonstrations would hurt his business
more than agreeing to integrater especially under the

conditions he was able to impose as part of the agreement. 21

This case highlights one of the peculiarities of the
whole area of discrimination in this country.

Gunnar Myrdal

has pointed out that Americans feel a "moral uneasiness" at

their failure to make their practice conform to the American
creed of equality and opportunity for everyone.

When this

failure is made obvious, then Americans feel conflict. 22

The United States has a high official morality while

practice is often revealed as being very immoral.

Thus

individuals must rationalize this conflict in some manner.

They may believe that they did not create the system and
that therefore they are not responsible for it; they may

20jnterview, Royce McDonald, April 21, 1971.
^Interview, Roger Gross, May 12, 1971.

22Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York:
Harper, 1944), p. 60 and passim.
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believe that they have no real choice, and since their role
is

so infinitesimal, they do not have any guilt.

will not admit that there is a problem at all.

Or they

These people

are so familiar with the caste and class lines that they

regard them as normal.

This group believes that Negroes

want to live with their own kind, are happier in Negro

churches and schools, and appreciate "white folks" looking
out for their interests.

Another method of rationalization is bifurcation, to
rationalize by making exceptions.

This involves pointing to

the few Negroes who do not fit the pattern and rationalizing

that, if they could make good, so could all the rest, if they
wanted to. 9 °9

Yet, this moral uneasiness also means that public

agencies in areas outside the deep South feel they must give
verbal support to anti-discrimination efforts, whatever

their private practices may be.

Despite the verbal

assurance by the Council regarding non-discrimination, it

was brought out by the Commission that the city discriminated

informally in placing workers.

While men did not request

certain positions on their applications to work for the city,

at this time, all members of the refuse department were
Negro and all members of the street department were white.

The application forms did have a place for race of the
applicant.

When questioned about this practice, the City

^^This discussion follows that in Allport, pp. 314-17.
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Manager could answer only that he could see no reason for
the situation, while a City Council member suggested that

since the refuse employees were paid on an incentive basis
while the street department was not, perhaps the Negroes

preferred to work in this department. 24

The White Pantry
The second public accommodations case was also

brought to the Commission’s attention by the CIP group, and
by the same methods, picketing and sit-ins.

But the White

Pantry case was to prove a continuing source of conflict

because the ownerr Roba Quessenberry, would not bow either
to the private pleadings of the Commission and the City

Fathers, to the statewide publicity, the business
inconvenience of the sit-ins, or to the severe public
tongue-lashing of Judge Hereford.

This incident followed the demonstrations at

Bailey’s by about six weeks.

During that period, the CIP

had sent out test groups to many restaurants, Camden Park,
the local amusement park, and the YMCA.

In this wayr they

discovered that the White Pantry followed a stated policy of

discrimination and decided to repeat their demonstrations.

The White Pantry differed from Bailey’s in that it was
smaller and was open twenty-four hours a day (a fact the CIP
felt would help their case). 9 S

24Commission Minutes, October 2, 1962.

25Interview, Danie Stewart, May 11, 1971.
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The demonstrations began in much the same way as
those at Bailey’s, but Mr. Quessenberry reacted much more
violently than did Mr. Walker.

During the six weeks between

the initial sit-in on July 13, 1963, and the hearing on his

injunction petition on September 6, Mr. Quessenberry burned
insecticides, sprayed with ammonia, shut off the air

conditioning, turned up the heat, and closed his restaurant

in an effort to drive the demonstrators out of his
restaurant and to keep them out.2^

There were some other differences between the

demonstrations at the White Pantry and those at Bailey’s.
In the first place, the picketing groups increased and

included groups other than just the CIP.

The NAACP in

Huntington and many sympathetic Negroes from throughout the

region came to Huntington to participate in the marching and
lend verbal and physical support to those who sat-in, braving

the abuse Mr. Quessenberry provided.

27

In the second place, Mr. Quessenberry seemed to
become personally involved with the demonstrators.

This was

partially due to the close quarters in the White Pantry,
partly the personality of Mr. Quessenberry, but mostly due

to the long drawn-out nature of the battle.

Although the

sit-ins began in July of 1963, Mr. Quessenberry was still

^Testimony, Quessenberry v. Cleckley, Cabell County
Circuit Court, Civil Action No. 10514, September 6, 7, 1963,
pp. 127-155.

2 7 Interview,

Danie Stewart.
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spraying insecticide and closing his restaurant in September

and October of 1964.

It was not until the 1964 Civil Rights

Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in December of 196 4 that
Mr. Quessenberry's attorney announced his client would

attempt to abide by the law.

Even then Mr. Quessenberry

would not agree to serve Phil Carter, the CIP leader.

no

If Bailey’s had evoked concern in the community, it
was very little compared to that engendered by the White
Pantry.

The demonstrations and Mr. Quessenberry1s violent

reactions were closely followed in the news media, not only

in Huntington, but throughout the state.

A parade of public

figures visited the White Pantry to try to persuade Mr.

Quessenberry to change his policy.

City Council, the Civil

Rights Commission, the State Human Rights Commission, as

.
. .
.
.
.
29
well as many private citizens all tried discussion.

The

City Council received delegations of Negro citizens and
members of the CIP asking that they take some kind of action

on the case.

At one City Council meeting various Council

members deplored Mr. Quessenberry ’ s attitude and castigated

the City Manager (Mr. Hoisington) for continuing to eat in

the White Pantry despite the adverse publicity. 30
In September of 196 3 Mr. Quessenberry attempted to

obtain injunctive relief.

The case was heard by the same

28Commission Minutes, December 15, 1964.

^Testimony, Quessenberry v. Cleckley, p. 156 .
30 Huntington Advertiser, August 27, 1963, p. 11.
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Judge, John Hereford, who had summarily denied Floyd
Walker* s petition.

This time he heard two days of testimony

and handed down a verdict denying the petition in which he
said:

I will say here and now as I said a few months
ago in another case of like kind, that I don’t think
any lawyer could dispute the fact that the Supreme
Court of the United States has by its decisions said
that the American Negro has civil rights the same as
any other citizen; that . . . the Constitution of the
United States guarantees to them the same rights that
it guarantees to me.
And yet,

.

. . there are little people in the
world that would still deprive American Negroes, who
are American citizens the same as I am, of the rights
that were promised them 100 years ago but have been
denied them for 99 to 100 of that period since the
promise was made.

What this petitioner is doing is depriving the
American Negroes of Huntington or elsewhere from
coming into his place of business and enjoying the
same privileges of his fine restaurant—although I
have never been in it I am sure it is a fine one —
declining to allow a person, just because his skin
is a different color then mine, refusing to allow
him the same privilege that I would be allowed if
I walked into his place of business.
I say, that is something that the Supreme Court
has, I think very definitelyf watered down and placed
in the area of condemnation. And if what the petitioner
is doing was done by a governmental agency, by a state,
by a city, by a county, that would be enjoined
immediately from doing such a thing, from practicing
segregation in a business that is operated by taxation.
And yet the petitioner would come into this court and
ask this court to protect him in his attempt to do that
which the Supreme Court of the United States says that
the state couldn’t do or the county couldn’t do.

Now, let us concede that as an American citizen he
has rights the same as everybody else, and he has a
right to be foolish if he wants to; he has a right to
take the position that he is not going to permit,
integration in his place of business; he has a right to
do all of those things. And I would be the first to

42
accord him those rights. But I am saying now I am
holding that he has no right to come into a court
of law and ask me as judge of this court, in a court
of chancery, in a court of conscience, in a court of
the heart—he has no right to come into this court
and ask me to protect him in doing something that
the Constitution of the United States, according to
the Supreme Court, says is not proper and could not
be done by a governmental agency.

So this court is not about to lend its good
offices to help this petitioner or any other petitioner
to enforce something that is contrary to the spirit of
the Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
And I am going to go further and hold in this
proceeding that when a man such as this petitioner
gets a license from the State of West Virginia and
from the City of Huntington—and the court takes
judicial notice of that fact--to serve the public in
the form of furnishing a place for people to eat, and
when that business that he is operating has to be
inspected by the health department of the city, they
have to make an examination of the cleanliness of the
place, the toilet facilities, the cleanliness of the
kitchen, they have to go in there and inspect it and
place a rating on the business, and that has to be
done by a public official, and that public official
is paid by taxpayers ’ money, including taxes that are
paid by the Negroes, and then make the Negroes help
pay for inspecting a restaurant that only white people
can eat in, and that the door is slammed in the face
of the Negroes, is, I think, unreasonable and
unpardonable.

I think, in addition to that, that there have to
be fire inspections that have to be conducted by
public officials that are paid by the taxpayers,
including taxes that are paid by the Negroes too. And
to tax the Negro in order to pay the salaries of some
body that has to inspect a business from which the
Negro is shut out, is not good Americanism, is not
Constitutional, and is contrary, in my way of thinking,
to the laws of the great State of West Virginia.
So I am about to say and am saying that when the
State of West Virginia issues a license and the City
of Huntington issues a license to do business and
serve the public, that the Negro is as much a part
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of the public as the white man, and that they would be
obligated to serve him too. 31

Although this seems a fairly clear-cut decision on
the part of the judiciary, it proved to be another round of

nondecision-making.

For despite the public utterances of

all sections of the community, Mr. Quessenberry still refused
to serve Negroes in his restaurant.

All the denial of the

injunction meant was that the situation could continue

despite the fact that the judge and the City Council dis-

approved.

Their words provided the protestors with symbolic

reassurance; after all, they had done all they could in the

situation; Mr. Quessenberry would not listen to reason; and
reason and moral suasion were the only tools they had
available.

When decision is built on consensus without

coercion, a single dissenter can destroy the consensus and
force a nondecision, as did Mr. Quessenberry.
The only other public accommodations case to come

officially before the Commission was one involving a small

bar and grill that allegedly had refused to serve a racially
mixed couple.

This was after the passage of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act and after Commission members had talked to the

proprietress.

Their main thrust in conversation with her

was that the law required her to serve everyone.

The

^Decision, Quessenberry v. Cleckley, September 7,
This decision was printed verbatim in the
1963, pp. 333-48.
Sunday Hera1d-Advertiser r September 8, 1963.
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Commission members felt she remained noncommital.32
In this case there was nothing more the Huntington

Commission could do but advise the complainant to carry the
case to the state or national level.

Obviously, it is

impossible to push a case for every restaurant that chooses

to discriminate.

That is why, even today, Negroes who travel

throughout this country try to eat and sleep in chain motels
or restaurants located on main highways or in large cities.

This is the only way they may be assured of obtaining

service.33
Despite the all-encompassing nature of the 1964

Civil Rights Act in the field of public accommodations, this
legislation becomes a decision in practice only where it is

enforced.

Where there is non-compliance with the law there

is nondecision.

A decision in the system must be tied to

implementation.3^

32Letter to Dr. Paul D. Stewart, Chairman, Huntington
Commission on Human Rights, from Carl Glatt, Executive
Director of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission,
August 4, 1967.

23Interview, Dr. Thomas B. Wright, April 5, 1971.
3^The importance of implementation of legislation
illustrates how the status quo always has the advantage in a
decision-making (change) situation. At all stages it is
those that seek change that must make the greater effort.
Without effective local laws the procedure to obtain change
on a national level is very slow and often very expensive.^
In some areas of discrimination, such as school desegregation
which depend on some form of monetary support that can be
withheld, compliance may be exchanged for cash despite
dislike of the change. But the slow pace of school
desegregation since the Brown decision in 1954 illustrates
the point that legislation alone is not the whole answer,
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EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

During its first year of operation the Commission
made various surveys to identify the actual discriminatory
practices that might exist in Huntington.

The Commission

members were divided into subcommittees that investigated
different areas.

One of the major subcommittees was one

that investigated employment opportunities.
Employment Survey

In the spring of 19 6 3 this subcommittee made its
report.

This employment practices survey found eighteen

businesses in Huntington that declared they had a stated
policy of no discrimination in hiring; the actual employment

figures presented an interesting interpretation of this
statement.

At American Car and Foundry there were 25 Negroes

employed out of 900 employees.

people, of whom four were Negro:

Heiner’s Bakery employed 115

a janitor, two truck

washers, and a mechanic.

Mootz Bakery employed 95 persons,

none of whom were Negro.

People’s Manufacturing Company

hired 115; 105 were women and one was a Negro, a matron.
Pepsi Cola bottlers employed 34; none were Negro.

The Dr.

Pepper bottlers employed 40? none were Negro, although the

especially legislation at the national level. This was the
main reason for the real fear in Huntington of a local open
housing law, despite the existence of such laws on the state
and national level. Those who do not wish to see open
housing recognize that local laws might make change a reality,
instead of just a threat, because of local enforcement, thus
causing a nondecision to become a decision.
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manager stated he had offered work to two Negro students
from Marshall University who did not accept his offer.

At

the Maidenform plant there were no Negro employees; only two
had applied in the previous twelve years.

At the Huntington

Manufacturing Company, there were two Negro employees, both

matrons; this company stated they would not hire Negroes

because their employees wouldn’t like it. 35
At the Coca Cola bottling company 4 percent of the

employees were Negro and the company stated they would not
be willing at that time to hire Negroes in sales positions. 36

At Polan Industries, 10 percent of the work force was Negro;

"since they were a defense plant, the law required no

discrimination in employment."

At Owens-Illinois, "there

were no records available,11 but they stated they did have a

"fair number" of Negroes employed.

H. K. Porter had nine

Negro employees, eight employed as janitors, and the other

in charge of the mailroom.
their Negro draftsman."

International Nickel had "hired

At the Huntington Water Corporation

(a private company), there was a Negro employed as a janitor.

The Ohio Valley Bus Company had 140 employees; six of whom

^One Commission member who was the local agent for
the Ladies Garment Workers, the union at this plant, made
inquiries from the main office of the company. He was told
that the company had no discrimination policy and that there
must be some misunderstanding in their Huntington plant.
Commission Minutes, May 21, 1963.
3 6 The employment figures are given in different
statistical forms because the report was compiled by three
different people, each used his own system of reporting.
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were Negroes, four janitors and two mechanics; there were no
Negro bus drivers,

"None had ever applied."

At another

public utility, United Fuel Gas, there were two Negro
janitors and a maid who worked with the home economist.

Houdialle-Hersey had no Negro employees out of a total work
force of one thousand.

The plant spokesman stated that

there were only four hundred of these men working now, and
the other six hundred had to be recalled before the company
could do any new hiring.
Appalachian Power had twelve Negro employees:

one

messenger, nine janitors, one receptionist, and a maid for
the home economist.

At International Nickel, there were

Negroes employed, but the personnel people did not have a

count.

However, they did say that they were making a real

effort to hire Negro clerical help, but that few were
qualified,

"and we want only the best. i.37

The industry report was summed up by a statement
that apparently few Negroes apply for jobs, that those who
do are unskilled, and that employment prospects in the city

are not good for anyone.

It was added that Negroes are

often not aware of places where there are job openings and

that the Negro leaders should "educate their people to these
opportunities and to the responsibilities carried with

them. 1,38

This report showed the real lack of opportunity

3Commission Minutes, November 7, 1962.

38Ibid.
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for Negroes to be employed in the city in any but low-level
positions.

There were some glaring ommissions in the employment
survey.

One of the largest (and reportedly most discriminatory) 39 employers in the city, the C & 0 Railroad,
was not surveyed.

The number of Negroes employed in the

large Federal civil service in the city was not surveyed,

although the Army Corps of Engineers visited a Commission
meeting to tell them the Corps would actively recruit

Negroes who could pass the civil service examination.

At

that time, the representatives from the Engineers stated
that there were only nine Negroes out of five thousand

employees in this district. 40

The six banks in the city

were not surveyed, nor were the grocery stores.

The C & P Telephone Company had a member on the
Commission, and his reports indicated that the company was

making a real effort to hire and train Negroes in all
capacities.

Marshall University was not surveyed.

At that

time there were no Negroes employed except as matrons or
maintenance personnel.

In trying to investigate employment opportunities

the Commission was faced with employers who claimed to be

following a non-discriminatory policy, yet told all Negro
applicants that they were not hiring and refused to give

^Interview, Charles Smith, March 26, 1971.
^Commission Minutes, October 18, 1963 .
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them applications.

Without specific legislation covering

fair employment practices there was little that could be
done.

Another problem indicated by the Commission survey

was companies that do hire Negro help hire Negroes only in

the most menial positions.

Others "do not apply" or "are

not trained n for the job.

At companies like International

Nickel there is another barrier for anyone applying for a

job.

In this company there is deliberate nepotism and many

relatives work for the company.

This means that the

employees who are the first to know when the company is
hiring are sure to let their family and friends know
immediately, so the jobs may indeed be taken by the time

someone else would apply, despite the company personnel

policy.41

There was a discussion within the Commission about
whether or not to publicize this survey information, and if

it was publicized, whether to reveal the names of the
companies involved.

After much discussion it was decided

not to print the information.

It was felt that it would be

better if the Negro leaders and others with contacts would

make every effort to let qualified Negroes know the hiring

policies of these companies and then follow up on any

41Charles Smith, while generally most uncomplimentary
of the hiring practices of businesses in Huntington, did say
he thought International Nickel had been sincere and
concerned in their efforts to hire Negro personnel,
especially in the past few years. Interview, March 26, 1971.
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complaints in hiring practices after that.

Negroes on the

Commission remarked that most Negroes with job skills leave
the area for better opportunities in larger cities, and it

was agreed that job opportunities were not great for anyone
in the city, black or white.42

Whether or not the publi

cation of the report would have changed anything, the
Commission opted for nondecision in this case.
Retail Sales
As a result of the employment practices survey it

also was found that none of the retail stores employed Negro

sales help.

Commission members thought that this might be

an excellent place for the Commission to work toward

acceptance of Negroes in Huntington.

Since these stores

usually hired extra help for the Christmas selling season
it was decided to try Negro clerks at this time.

The

Commission set up a special training program in selling
techniques, grooming, and other facets of retail sales.

Of

the number trained, several were hired on an individual
store basis for the 1963 Christmas season.

Anderson Newcomb

refused to participate in the Commission’s effort. but the

national chains, J. C. Penney, the Bazaar, and Sears Roebuck,

were the most cooperative and hired Negro clerks on a
-u
•
43°
permanent, basis.

42commission Minutes, January 15, 1963.
43Commission Minutes, May 21, 1963; December 17,
1963; September 17, 1963.
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The Commission was able to accomplish its purpose in
the hiring of Negro clerks in retail stores.
were varied.

The reasons

One was the character of the people involved

who felt that it was the right thing to do.

The Commission

also helped by working out a positive training program and
agreeing to find Negro replacements in case any of those

hired might be fired or leave for any reason.

The big

chains like Penney’s and Sears might have hired Negro clerks

as part of their national policy without the Commission’s

urging, but there can be no doubt that its leadership in the
matter made it easier for the locally owned stores to follow.
This was a very real effort on the Commission’s part and,

although the total number of employees hired permanently was

not large, it was a start and succeeded in breaking the

color line in a very big employment area.

This effort

showed that there are ways a Commission that can only talk

can accomplish some positive good.

With their work in retail sales the Commission
discovered that fair employment practices were one of the

easier areas of discrimination to begin to eliminate, partly

because whites find equal employment the least offensive,
and also because improvement in employment opportunities

gives maximum satisfaction to Negroes.

This is similar to

Allport’s study in which he found employers often are

following what they consider to be accepted folkways, and
are cooperative when assured that customers, employees, and
the law prefer, or at least expect, no discrimination in
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hiring practices.

Although employees and customers will

object if asked in advance, the actual practice of equality
brings little objection.

"Experiments have shown that

ordinary stream of living equality will be taken for granted

provided that the issue is not brought into consciousness
and verbally articulated. ..44

While this observation proved

generally true in the Commission’s work in Huntington,
neither Allport nor the Huntington Commission dealt with the
upgrading of employment opportunities that would involve

Negroes in supervisory positions with white employees.

is often an area of greater conflict.

This

There was little,

also, that the Commission could do about the kind of jobs

that were open to Negroes.

Qualified applicants were needed

to test the hiring policies, as was a fair employment law to
give applicants some recourse in the event of discrimination

in hiring.

RECREATION
Another one of the Commission’s subcommittees

studied recreation possibilities in Huntington and the

surrounding area.

They found Camden Park was segregated.

The owners stated they remained segregated because they
feared racial violence and because of the roller skating
rink they operated which involved changing partners.

Segregation was found to be the practice in all the roller

^^Allport, pp. 434-35.
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skating rinks in the city, mainly for fear of incidents over
mixed couples or other "embarrassing situations."45

None of

the rink owners would agree to allow Negroes in the rinks
until after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Law.

The

Commission was not able to influence their policy.

Most bowling lanes claimed to follow a non-discrim-

inatory policy. as did all the movie theaters.

The Colonial

Lanes followed a policy of discrimination, and the management
feared economic loss if they opened their lanes to all.

How

ever,. the management did state they would allow Negroes in
the Industrial Leagues and suggested this might be the best
way to approach the problem.

Mr. Lloyd Frankel, the manager,

suggested that the Commission talk with the Industrial League

bowlers if they were really interested in opening his business .

If they integrated, he said, he would go along. 46
Mr. Frankel used a nondecision approach that is a

favorite of many institutions, the technique of forcing the

individual attempting the change to take one more step, the
person asked to make the decision says that he will go along
if everyone else will.

It then takes only one holdout to

stifle change effectively.^^

^commission Minutes, April 16, 1963.
^Commission Minutes, January 15, 1963.

4^This nondecision strategy is a special favorite of
bureaucratic organizations. What student has not heardr
"Well, I will sign that request if you can get the Dean to
sign it." The student then finds that the Dean will not sign
unless the department chairman will, and the department

54

HOUSING
In Huntington, housing for Negroes has long been

confined to a limited geographical area bounded by the rail-

road tracks on the north, 15th street on the west, running
to Charleston Avenue on the south over to 18th street with
a two block swing southward, then to 19th or 20th streets

and Eighth Avenue again.

Only since the very late sixties

have professional people, lawyers, dentists, and teachers

moved outside the ghetto area. 48

In 1963 the Commission conducted a real estate
survey.

Brokers said they would show housing to anyone who

asked, but also said they would abide by the wishes of the
owner concerning selling to Negroes in white neighborhoods. 49
This problem was highlighted in 1965 by the efforts of

Negroes in professional positions in the Women’s Job Corp
Center who were unable to find suitable rental housing in

the city although price was not the prime consideration.

A

group of concerned citizens, Commission members and others,

chairman wants to talk to the student’s adviser, and so on.
They hope that somewhere along the way the student will give
up and no one will have to make any kind of decision.
Referring a problem to a study committee can have the same
effect.

^interview, Herbert Henderson, March 26, 1971.

49commission Minutes, February 16, 1965. This
report was compiled by a subcommittee headed by Mrs. Helen
Gunn who added a note that she knew from personal experience
that Negroes could not find housing in white areas, and so
questioned the answers she had received for the survey.
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attempted to help these people find housing.

Finally Judge

Hereford offered rental property that he owned and the Job

Corps personnel were finally able to find a place to live.50
Even in a 1968 housing survey one Negro leader said
he felt the community was still looking the other way and
not helping the cause p f open housing.

By ignoring the

problem, he said, the white community hopes that it will go

away.

H

The very traditional and conservative approach to

life in Huntington makes it most stifling. ..51

In the same

survey Mr. James Setzer, then President of the West Virginia
Homebuilders Association, said he assumed the Hunting ton
Board of Realtors did not see itself in the role of shaping
or influencing community attitudes.

Its chief responsibility

in its own view, said Mr. Setzer, is to enforce ethical

behavior in the buying and selling of property. 52

It was

not until 1971 that the West Virginia legislature passed an
open-housing law similar to the 1968 Federal statute.

There is a very obvious mobilization of bias in
Huntington on the subject of open housing.

Segregated

housing patterns reinforce one of the major mores of this
city; to break them is to evoke a major emotional reaction.
This reaction is usually couched in the language of loss of

50Huntington Herald Dispatch, February 10, 1966, p. 1.

^Community Housing Survey, Huntington League of
Women Voters, January, 1969 , p. 11(Mimeographed.)
52lbid., P- 10.
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private property rights and the freedom of an individual to
sell his property to whom he chooses.

As one student of the

subject found, detractors of fair housing legislation believe

it means "compulsion or loss of freedom of choice.

.

Their perspectives on the issue do not include the acceptance
of the fact of discrimination. "53

This barrier of community bias refuses to let the
problem of discrimination in the buying and selling of
property enter the policy-making arena, another example of

nondecision strategy.

The community attitude is perpetuated

by whites who do not want Negro neighbors for fear their
property might depreciate; by Negroes who do not want to
move because they are afraid of white animosity toward them-

selves or their children; and by real estate agents who will

not take the lead because they are

best for their clients.

ii

ii

trying to do what is

Whites will not sell because they

are afraid their neighbors will object; thus change does not

come.
The Commission was unable to effect any change in

housing patterns in Huntington without an open-housing law
to provide incentive.

The state and federal legislation has

helped the middle-class Black to move.

53Harlan Hahn, "Northern Referenda on Fair Housing:
The Response of White Voters," The Western Political
Quarterly, XXI (September, 1968), 493.
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EDUCATION

Another major area of concern to the Commission was
racial problems in the school system.

The Commission was

hindered in its official dealing with the public school

system because the Board of Education is an independently
elected board, separate from the other political units in
the city and county, and the Commission thus had no official

status with the Board.

Initial desegregation in the Cabell County public
schools followed quickly on the heels of the 1954 Brown

decision.

The Board of Education redrew the attendance lines

so that while there were a few Negroes in some formerly white
elementary schools, one elementary school remained all-Negro,

and another was largely so.

Moreover, the all-Negro school

was given open status which allowed any child in the county

to attend this school, but naturally the only students that
took advantage of this provision were black.

level the pattern was the same.

On the secondary

While Negroes were permitted

to attend Huntington High, most of them continued to attend
Douglas, the Negro junior-senior high school located in the
Negro area.

A few of the ”achievers" did attend Huntington

High, and Douglas was regularly raided for black athletes,
but until it was closed in 1961, most Negroes did not attend

schools with whites in Hunting ton.

c4

5 interviews, Helen Gunn, April 3, 1971; Hite
Compton, April 21, 1971.
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After Douglas was closed Huntington High had several

racial disturbances.

The Commission membersr especially the

Negro members, would often act as conciliators, but as
individuals, not officially for the Commission.

The

Commission did attempt to offer their help to the school
administration, but were rebuffed and told there were no

racial problems in the Huntington schools.55
The Commission received various complaints of

discrimination in the schools; some involved specific teachers,

others were concerned with the lack of opportunity for
participation in extra-curricular life of the schools (except
athletics)

and harrassment from a "punk” element r especially

of any attempts at inter-racial dating.56

This racial

guerilla warfare finally culminated in the Keith-Albee

incidentr the turning point in the life of the Commissionr

on January 1, 1966.

These racial incidents in the schools

continued throughout the sixties, and it was not until 196 7
and the spring of 19 68 that the school system finally

admitted that there might be some racial friction, and made
some move to alleviate the complaints of discrimination.

When this was done there was a backlash from the white

community who resented the opening of the high school1 s clubs

and the appointment of black cheerleaders and majorettes.

57

^commission Minutes, December 3, 1962; May 21, 1963.
^interview, Hite Compton, April 21, 1971.

57 Huntington Herald Dispatch, September 20, 1967,
pp. 1, 9; October 4, 1967, p. !•
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The Commission did not have the confidence of the

Board of Education in dealing with racial friction in the
schools.

The Board of Education, however, is one of the few

decision-making bodies in the local political system to
actually make a decision.

Despite opposition from the white

community, the school board did grant some of the complaints
from the Negro community about discrimination in the schools.

They did abolish closed clubs at Huntington High and did
make provision for the selection of black majorettes and

cheerleaders.

Besides these positive steps, they did

tighten the school administration by new personnel appointments, and other means to prevent trouble from students or

non-students.

The school board has also (1970) abolished

the last all-Negro elementary school, after pressure from
blacks, and zoned all Negro children into other schools.

A

Black Studies curriculum has been instituted in the high

school and all textbooks are now passed for racial content.
While most of these improvements in the racial

atmosphere in the Huntington schools has come from direct
pressure from the black community or its leadership, some

have come in response to national trends.

Members of the

local Commission acted in times of racial conflict in an

individual capacity, although the State Commission sent
representatives to investigate disturbances, and they talked
unofficially with school personnel.

The Huntington

Commission proved ineffective in this area because the school

board would not admit there was a problem r and when they did
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finally admit it, the Commission was not granted the amicus
curiae position to work toward solving it.

The Board was

not about to grant any of its decision-making to another
group.

I

CHAPTER IV
THE COMMISSION, THE CAMPUS, AND THE CIP

The Commission had contact with Marshall University
either through faculty members who were Commission members,

or through concern with racial problems encountered by
Marshall students.

This was the era when college students

were involved with the Civil Rights movement, and this was
evidenced, in a small way, by the efforts of the Civic

Interest Progressives at Marshall.
Besides the incidents at the White Pantry and

Bailey’s the Commission was involved in several other
incidents brought to their attention by the CIP.

Discrimination at Camden Park and the YMCA was documented by
the CIP, as well as segregation at Colonial Lanes and

various eating and drinking places around the campus itself.

The Commission talked to the establishments involved except
for those catering especially to university students; these

were referred to the university administration.
By 19 6 4 the CIP had also decided to act as a party

to any incident on the university campus involving Negro
students.

One of these involved the Kappa Alpha fraternity.

Icommission Minutes, March 19, 196 3.
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The fraternity had an annual "Old South" Ball in the spring,
its main social function of the year.

At this time the

fraternity members would dress in Confederate uniforms,

their dates in ante-bellum gowns, and they would parade to

the campus, raise the Confederate flag, and declare control
of the campus for the weekend to the playing of "Dixie."

The CIP group had already objected to the playing of "Dixie"
at university athletic events, and they petitioned President

Stewart Smith to limit the fraternity events to their own
grounds.

President Smith answered that the fraternity had

already been given permission to have their traditional
ceremony and he would not ask them to change their plans.

2

But the fraternity members turned the CIP protest

into a non-event.

The fraternity members marched onto

campus wearing suits rather than their uniforms, and instead
of raising the Confederate flag and singing "Dixie," the

fraternity president asked the band to play the national

anthem and the members recited the Pledge of Allegiance.

3

While the CIP had accomplished their stated goal, they had
lost their real battle against the discrimination of the
fraternity system.

The fraternity received nothing but

praise for their handling of the event while nothing really
changed in the fraternity system.

This is an excellent

Huntington Herald Dispatch, May 2, 1964, p. 1.
3Ibid.
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example of nondecision strategy.4
While the Huntington Commission was not presented
with the problem of the Old South weekend, they were

presented with the

social function.

11

Blue Mountain Blast,” another fraternity

In March, 1965, a student delegation from

Marshall asked for a hearing before the Commission on
conflicting stories of an altercation at an off-campus

fraternity dance the preceeding weekend, which the CIP had
chosen to publicize as a discrimination case.

The dance followed a hillbilly theme and a band of
Negro musicians had been hired to play.

The fraternity

president stated that two members and a guest who had been
drinking heavily hit one of the band members after the dance,

which resulted in retaliation and a general melee among the

fraternity members and the band.

The fraternity president

felt that race was not involved, that the real problem was

that the people involved were drunk.
The band members stated that it was a racial

incident because much racial language had been used during
the break and after the dance; the band members stated they
had repeatedly asked the fraternity members to get off the

stage and stop meddling with the equipment, but that they
had refused to do so.

4The real implications of the nondecision show up in
the years since that time. Up to 1970 Negro groups were
still protesting discrimination in the fraternity system and
the Dixie elements of the Old South weekend.
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Members of the CIP testified, as did the West

Virginia NAACP college chapter vice-president, all of whom
used the incident to point out segregation in the social
fraternity system; they asked that the fraternity be put on
social probation and those persons directly involved be
dismissed from school.$

It became obvious during the discussion that the
group had come before the Commission because the Marshall
administration did not consider the CIP a legitimate party
to the event.

The day after the Commission hearing,

President Smith of Marshall made this statement:
It is not the prerogative of the CIP or any other
group to dictate to the university administration
what penalties should be given in this or any other
incident.

It (the CIP) has a right to protest, but any
interference in the university’s authority to
administer its rules is an encroachment upon the
governing responsibilities of the institution.
. . . By assuming it can speak for the university,
although not accountable to the university r the CIP
group has placed itself in a highly ambiguous and
indefensible position. When a decision is made, it
will be our decision.

^Commission Minutes, March 16, 1965.
^Huntington Herald Dispatch, March 17, 1965, p. 1.
President Smith did eventually suspend two of the students
involved, and put the fraternity on social probation. How
ever, he ruled out racism as a factor and said the alter
cation was a result of student drinking, and his suspension
was based on "university regulations concerning intoxication
’ ‘ , not on pressure from the CIP."
and general conduct,
Huntington Herald Dispatch, March 18, 1965, p. 1, ff.
Refusal to recognize a group as a legitimate party to a
dispute is also a nondecision strategy.
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What the CIP had done, however, was to force the
university administration to face the problem, and it also

forced the campus and community to a public confrontation
with a group charging bias and discrimination, something

most of the community would rather not admit existed, or at
least believed was the exception rather than the rule.

Not

only this, but the CIP charged that discrimination was
inherent in the fraternity system, a direct challenge to the

status quo.
The hearing before the Huntington Civil Rights

Commission served to give these charges a public forum,
publicity the university administration would probably

rather have avoided.

The Commission admitted they had no

jurisdiction in the matter but they thought they could
provide discussion of the attitudes involved, as well as a

way for both sides to discuss the issue on an impartial

basis.

The Commission took no action on the matter, but

deferred to the university.

In this case, the public airing

of the problem by the Commission forced the appropriate
decision-making body (the university administration) to take

action.

The action taken resulted in a nondecision regarding

the overall problem of fraternity discrimination, but did

provide some recognition of a "discipline” problem if not a

racial one.

By calling the problem by another name non-

decision was effected but the CIP had obtained publicity for
their charges, a sympathetic hearing before the Commission,

and some recognition, if not bargaining power.
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The previous autumn the CIP had come before the

Commission in a public meeting concerning their running
battle with Mr. Quessenberry, the owner of the White Pantry.

The CIP had again attempted to obtain service at the

restaurant to see if Mr. Quessenberry was complying with the
recently passed Civil Rights Act.

Instead of complying, Mr.

Quessenberry set off sulpher bombs, carried an electric
cattle prod and obtained trespassing warrants against four

of the CIP, as well as a peace bond against Phil Carter.

After the facts were presented the meeting was
opened for comment from the audience.

Various questions

were asked about the case, and City Council members said
their policy on public accommodations was a matter of record,

and there was little more they could do.

Councilman John

Meek said that he felt people in business should have the
freedom to sell to individuals, and it was regrettable that
the CIP had chosen to try Mr. Quessenberry out again.

Chairman Smith then pointed up the moral law
involved, and stated that it was the responsibility of the

Commission to indicate to the community its feeling.
then asked for comments from Commission members.

He

At this

point, Rabbi Frank Sundheim and Mr. Roger Gross both said

they thought a public expression of opinion on the part of
the Commission might help the community to see the problem
as it existed.

There was some concern by members that the

Commission should help mold community attitudes toward

compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 196 4.

Mr. McKinney

i

Il

67

of the State Commission suggested a resolution concerning

the law and the following was adopted:

Having met to consider this particular incident,
it appears to be an appropriate time for the
Huntington Commission on Civil Rights to reaffirm
its support of the Civil Rights Act and to request
of our citizenry compliance with and moral support
of this law. We urge in addition that citizens
send letters to the Department of Justice calling
for an investigation of the local situation and
intervention if so warranted. 7
This was the strongest public position to date for

the Commission and, although still a nondecision, put the

community on notice that the Commission was deliberately
seeking to change accepted community norms.

The CIP had

succeeded in forcing action from a group by first providing
publicity.

At its regular October meeting a discussion was held

regarding the public meeting with the CIP.

Rabbi Sundheim

commented that he thought the idea of a public meeting was

good but that after the testimony was heard the Commission

should then close its meeting for deliberation and dis —
cussion.

Another Commission member indicated she had been

approached by the CIP and told that they felt the only way

to show real support of the Civil Rights movement was to
join in the demonstrations, that to sit back and not act was

to show public approval of the status quo.

There was much

discussion in the meeting of the different roles to be

^Commission Minutes, October 1, 1964.
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played in this situation.®

This public meeting was the first

recognition that the Commission was beginning to understand

their somewhat ambiguous role, and the dawning of the feeling
that the Commission should have a more satisfactory structure

within city government.

Again the CIP acted as a catalyst to

start reaction within the Commission.

The last recorded incident involving the Commission
with the CIP occurred on the Marshall campus itself.

In May

of 1965 a racially mixed group was returning from a picnic to

the Marshall campus.

The group was loud and boisterous and

when approached by two men whom they recognized as city
policemen, members of the group made remarks to them.

The

police were not in uniform, but had been hired by Marshall to
handle traffic and other police-related work on the campus
incidental to the end of the semester.

The police were

accused by the students of using foul and racial language
against them and one of the policemen, Robert Linville, was

accused of pulling his gun.

Later two policemen in uniform

appeared, but took no action since they said they had

witnessed nothing but had conflicting stories from the

students the off-duty police.

The CIP members who testified felt the incident

would not have occurred if the students involved had not
been Negro.

After questioning the group the Commission

voted to ask the City Manager for a thorough investigation

Commission Minutes, October 20, 1964 .
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of the incident and a report.

The City Manager’s report

gives this account.

The University had requested the services of two
off-duty policemen. On the night in question a group
of approximately fifteen people, all but one of whom
were Negroes, were returning from an outing in Ritter
Park. The officers claim the group was loud and
boisterous and used very profane language to them.
The officers then stated they approached the group
and inquired which one of them had used the profane
language. At this point a large non-student allegedly
said, ’Let me have him,’ and started toward the
officers. The officer stated that he was afraid that
physical harm was about to be inflicted on him and to
prevent it drew his gun. Loud verbal exchanges occurred
until uniformed officers arrived on the scene.

Members of the group complained that the officers
were drunk, so the uniformed officers took them to
Cabell-Huntington Hospital where blood samples were
drawn which proved to be negative on alcohol tests.
The City Manager stated that he did not believe that the

officer should have drawn his gun, nor did he believe that
some members of the group should have acted in a manner to
make the officer fear physical violence.

He concluded this

report that he had advised President Smith of Marshall that

off-duty policemen working for Marshall would not be

permitted to carry guns, since nightsticks were, in his

opinion, sufficient for protection and for maintaining order

among students.

^Commission Minutes, May 18 , 1965.
l^Memo from Edward A. Ewing to the Huntington Human
Rights Commission concerning the Marshall University incident
of May 15, 196 5, dated June 23, 1965 . Since that time
Marshall has beefed up its own security forces but the issue
of guns on campus is still a matter of contention between
students and the university administration.
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There is no way of knowing whether the CIP protest
or the Commission’s interest caused the new policy about

off-duty police, but their efforts did encourage the City
Manager to act in this instance concerning one of the main

complaints about police, the fact that they used excessive
force on Negroes.
In each of these instances the CIP acted as a
catalyst or necessary ingredient to bring some sort of action

from the Commission.

This kind of symbiotic relationship is

characterized by Michael Lipsky in his study of protest

groups.

The Civic Interest Progressives meets his definition

of a protest group activity:

"a mode of political action

oriented toward objection to one or more policies or
conditions, characterized by showmanship or display of an

unconventional nature, and undertaken to obtain rewards from
political or economic systems while working within the
systems."

Lipsky argues that the problem of the powerless in
protest activities is to activate “third parties" to enter
the bargaining area in ways favorable to the protesters.
This is one of the few ways that powerless groups can

"create" bargaining resources.

Their appeal, then, is to

reference publics, groups with bargaining power who will

i:L
Michael Lipsky
Il-Michael
Lipsky r "Protest as a Political Resource,"
Cities and Suburbs: Selected Readings in Local Politics and
Public Policyf ed. Bryan T« Downes (Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), p. 215.
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enter the fight on the side of the protest groups and use

their resources to bargain with target groups, those who are
able to bring about the changes desired (the decision

makers) .

In the context of this study the Huntington Civil

Rights Commission acted as a reference public for the CIP

(the protest group) to try to influence the target group
(the City Council or the Marshall administration or the
restaurant owners) or whomever might change the discrimi

nation situation.

Judge Hereford would be another example

of a reference public.^2

Protest groups, according to Lipsky, serve to raise
the saliency of issues through the communications media and

appeals or threats to wider publics, but they are frequently
barred from policy-making councils by their militant

rhetorical style in which demands are phrased in a manner
unacceptable to those whose attitude toward public policy is

one of cautious concern that reflects not only their good
intentions, but their concern for such things as property

rights and due process.

Thus, protest-oriented groups,

whose primary talents are in dramatizing issues, lack the
credibility to present "objective" data or "responsible"

suggestions.

They need a reference public to serve as

arbiter and legitimizer. 13
This was the role played by the Commission for the

12Ibid. , pp. 215-16.

13Ibid., PP- 227-28.
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CIP and each needed the other in order to accomplish their

mutual goal of ending specific instances of discrimination.
The Commission was unable to play this role in the fraternity

disputes because it lacked status and a role within the

Marshall community.
Lipsky points out also that the target groups (e.g.,

City Council) may dispense symbolic satisfactions instead of
material ones.

They are apt to substitute appearances of

activity and commitment for tangible responses to protest

activity.

This may also satisfy the reference publics (e.g.,

the Commission) that attention is being paid to these

problems.

Publicist tactics thus may be seen as defensive

maneuvers , a nondecision tactic.

Another nondecision ploy

of target groups is to appear unable to grant protest goals.

They may claim they lack authority to grant protest goals as
the City Council in Huntington did in the White Pantry and

Bailey cases.

At the time it was suggested that the Council

take a stand favoring a local public accommodations law, 14

but the City Council found the easiest nondecision tactic
was simply to postpone action, especially if postponement

was accompanied by symbolic reassurances.

The Lipsky study shows, too, the importance of the

communications media in protest activities.

He says, "in

granting or withholding publicity, in determining what

information most people will have on most issues, and what

^commission Minutes, September 17, 1963.
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alternatives they will consider in response to issues, the
media .

. . set the civic agenda.”

The communications media

also set the limits of protest action.

If protest actions

are not considered important, protest organizations will not

succeed.

"There is no protest unless protest is perceived

and projected.

H15

The CIP was able to generate publicity

and make the public aware of the situations with which the

Commission was trying to work.

This concern for the media

was a problem for the Commission.

From the beginning of the

Commission’s existence there had been a split on how visible

The Executive order which

the Commission ought to be.

initiated the Commission stated it should work without undue

publicity but the Commission had found that it needed some
publicity to make the public aware of the fact of discrimi-

nation and what might be done about it.

Without some public

awareness there could be no change.
The most outspoken advocate of the need for public
awareness of the Commission’s efforts was Reverend Smith.

He perhaps realized that this was the only method of coercion
the Commission possessed.

When he became Chairman of the

Commission in September he initiated public hearings of

discrimination charges and public coverage of meetings.

16

The public meetings, at which the CIP brought complaints,

were a result of his policy.

Thus the CIP was able to

^Lipsky r P- 234.

^commission Minutes, September 15, 1964.
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generate the media coverage that the Commission had been

unable to obtain.
Prior to this time the Commission had found it
difficult to bring their information on race relations
problems in Huntington before the public.

Mr. Raymond

Brewster, editor of the newspaper, told Commission members

he did not feel this kind of information was "in the best
interest of the communityr the paper, or the Commission "17
After the Supreme Court upheld the 1964 Civil Rights Act the

Commission requested editorial support of the Act, but this

time Commission members were told by Mr. Brewster that such

support would no longer be timely; that such decisions were
self-explanatory; and that there was a possibility of

stirring up more animosity than goodwill if the papers did
•
1 Q
any agitating on the issue.
°

At this same meeting the Commission discussed

community attitudes in general and what the Commission might

do to build public concern about the problems.

The Chairman

remarked that the felt most citizens were unable or unwilling
to admit that problems in race relations exist in Huntington.
The Commission members agreed with the Chairman’s sense of

urgency and agreed to try inviting various persons to its

meetings to try to inform them of patterns of discrimination

^commission Minutes, April 16, 1963 .
^commission Minutes, January 26, 1965.
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in various facets of community life. 19

This kind of

discussion permeated almost every meeting of the Commission.

It took an outside group to provide the Commission with the
vehicle it needed to bring the problems before the citizens
of Huntington and the relevant decision-making groups.
But Lipsky warns that protest groups must build

their own political resources if they are to achieve long

run success, for the "image of power, unaccompanied by

material and observable rewards, leads to impressions of
helplessness and reinforces political apathy. .

IT

He also

points out the ease of changing discriminatory laws relative

to the changing of discriminatory institutions.2^

Lipsky1s

study seems to indicate that it is impossible for powerless

groups to exercise any influence in a nondecision situation
due to community bias and institutional barriers, such as

those in Huntington.
The CIP was not active after 1965 due to the
graduation of Pat Austin and Phil Carter, the real leader-

ship of the group.

Marshall University had previously

appointed its own Human Relations Commission but there

continued to be charges of discrimination on campus,
especially concerning fraternities and sororities.

The

protest group role has not been filled effectively in
Huntington since that time.

l^Ibid.

20Lipsky, p. 234.

Occasionally the publicist
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aspects have been occupied by black groups at Marshall or

Negro youth at Huntington High but both of these groups are
concerned with school policies and problems exclusively, not
with the general problem of discrimination, as was the CIP.21

21Phil Carter and Pat Austin both went on to work
professionally in protest group activities. They worked as
trainers for community organizers in the poverty program and
then as field personnel in the Civil Rights movement.
Interview, Marion Gray, April 22, 1971.

CHAPTER V

THE KEITH ALBEE INCIDENT:

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

On New Year's Eve, and early New Year's Day,

January 1, 1966, Huntington was forced again to face the
fact that there was a racial problem in Huntington.
The occasion was unplanned.

It was not a protest

action in the sense the Civic Interest Progressives planned
protest to highlight discriminationr but it still provided

the vehicle to spotlight some of the problems that the
people of Huntington preferred to keep outside the normal

decision-making arena.

The incident, itself, was pre

dominantly a disturbance in which teenagers started fighting

and name-calling at the annual New Year’s Eve monster movie

at a downtown theater, but the effect on the community was
the same as that of the summer riots in the larger urban
ghettoes in the sixties.

The Huntington Civil Rights Commission 1 became

involved in this incident through the efforts of the Chair-

man.

Reverend Smith had been called out by the police

1-There is some confusion about this time in the name
of the Commission. The name Civil Rights Commission is
carried on the minutes before March, 1966, but other public
announcements and correspondence use the name Human Rights
Commission. Human Rights Commission is used at all times
after March 15, so footnotes will show the name as used on
the source.

77

78

department to help "cool” the situation, especially after

Negro youths from the theater assembled at a corner in the

16th street (Negro) area.

The Chairman decided that it was

appropriate for the Commission to hear testimony, in open
hearing, of "statements by several persons who felt undue
force had been used by various members of the police force
2
during the incident."

The incident occurred on New Year’s Day, 1966, a

Saturday, and on Monday evening the public meeting was held
in City Hall Auditorium.

The Chairman read the following

statement:

This meeting has been called tonight for the
expressive [sic] purposes of airing grievances
of some of our citizens who were involved in
altercation with the police Saturday morning around
2 a.m.
The Human Rights Commission is
citizens interested in problems in
Any citizen of our calling has the
address this group if he feels his
been denied.

a group of
human rights.
privilege to
rights have

This meeting has been called tonight upon the
request of five families who feel that this is the
most appropriate avenue of redress.
The position of the Human Rights Commission at
this time,z will be of listening. It must be made
clear at this time and I beg each of you to listen
and listen well.

. . . this meeting was called for the purpose of
redress by some of the citizens involved who feel
that some of the policemen were brutal to them
unnecessarily in the performance of their duty. . .
It will not be used as another opportunity for persons

Report of the Huntington Human Rights Commission on
the New Year’s Eve incident at the Keith Albee Theater,
adopted at a special session February 1, 1966.

19

who have been seething with gripe to get it off his
chest.
It will not be used as an opportunity of
professional speech makers to get an audience.

But it will be used as a democratic right for
men of reason to deal with the problems that perplex
our society. . . .3
In the nondecision-making model, this kind of meeting

would be considered illegitimate and outside community norms,
and so it was.

Three young people gave statements, including

the son of one of the Commission members, Bobby Gunn.

Each

stated that he had been hit by police officers then "driven
around" and that he was not arrested.

Two were sixteen-year-

old boys, and the third was a fourteen-year-old girl, the
only one who admitted she had done any fighting.

Bobby Gunn

had not been in the theater, but had approached it about
2 a.m. to see what was going on.

The mother of an eighteen-year-old boy testified on
behalf of her son, who had returned to college.

She stated

he was coming down the stairs of the theater, assisting a

girl and had his hands outstretched to protect her from the
crowd when he was snatched by police and thrown out of the
theater.

When he tried to explain, he was charged with

disorderly conduct.

hurt.

He was roughed up, but not seriously

The mother wondered why, when he was in the process

of explaining to the officer, with his hands visible, a gun

had to be drawn on him.

^Commission Minutes, special meeting, January 3, 1966.
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Reverend Bracey asked why there were so many police
cars on 16th Street and 8th Avenue later?

Why were they

there when the trouble was downtown?

A deputy from the sheriff’s office answered that
there were two breaking-and-entering cases along 8th Avenue

which had to be answered.

He asked whether the charges made

were answerable or would be printed in the newspaper before
officers had a chance to reply.
The Chairman stated that the statements had been

publicly heard; if charges made were true, something must be

done about them; if they were not true, this must be found
out.
Mr. Ewing, the City Manager, made a statement in

which he expressed regret for the incident.

He indicated

that police stated the girl was not hit with a nightstick

(the audience disagreed with him) .

He stated that at 4 a.m.

people were gathered at the corners of 16th Street and 8th

and 9th Avenues; hence the presence of police to protect
life and property.

There were fights going on in several

places at once, and the police themselves were afraid of

what might happen.

He expressed the hope that all might

learn from the problems aired there. 4
The Commission then went into executive sessionr

where it was decided to hold another special meeting to hear
the policemen’s side of the incident.

4Ibid.

Mr. McKinney of the
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State Commission stated that this is not necessarily the
problem of the Commission alone, but that the Commission
could highlight the broader community problem by its
handling of the incident.

Mr. George Chamberlain of the

State Commission brought out that he understood the kids
went there looking for trouble and that this was just part

of the total picture of trouble in Huntington.

He said he

thought that Huntington was second only to Bluefield in its

potential for racial trouble.

The next night the Commission met again to hear the
police side of the incident.

Statements were given by

attorneys for the police officers involved:
Upon advice of counsel, the officers involved
feel that testimony given at this time before this
Commission would be improper in view of the fact
that criminal charges are pending and unresolved
against individuals arrested at the scene of the
riot.
It is further felt that since no specific
charges have been made against the conduct or
actions of any police officer, that comment at this
time would prove useless.
The officers involved state that neither they
nor any other officer, County or State, to their
knowledge, used excessive force or took any action
not warranted by the circumstances existing at the
time and such action and force as were used was
necessary to preserve the life and property of
innocent persons and of themselves. . . .66

Statements of like nature were presented by the
Fraternal Order of Police, the Chief of Police, and the City

Manager.

The City Manager’s statement ended with the comment:

5 Commission Minutes, executive session, January 3, 1966.
^Commission Minutes, January 4, 1966.
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The reports I have received indicate that the
incident under discussion was triggered by lawless
elements of our community. The city administration
is going on record as not tolerating hoodlism [sic]
by any lawless gangs or individuals. We have
instructed our police department to carry out this
policy and the administration will back them in
pursuance of this policy.7
This caused the Chairman of the Commission to remark that

the Commission does not necessarily reflect the feeling of
the statements issued by the city administration.

He asked

that there be no intimidation of the young people who had
appeared the previous night, and remarked that the Commission
could be only as effective as permitted by Council.

He

added that all municipal agencies have a mutual need; ”

if the police have a rightful cause, it will vindicate

At this point counsel for the officers involved
left with a large contingent of policemen in uniform. 8

itself.11

This was the beginning of the polarization of

opinion between the police department and the Commission in
Huntington that was to force the City Council to back one

side or the other; and since in this instance they upheld
the police department, the Council then felt it must

eventually give the Commission the ordinance status it sought,

7Ibid.
8Ibid. Mr. John Jenkins, one of the attorneys
invo 1 ved, said that the whole proceeding had turned into a
kangaroo court with no concern for the rules of evidence,
much hearsay testimony, and no definition of the term
brutality. He felt that the hearings were conducted in
m a
manner that had already presumed the officers guilty. He

felt the Commission was just interested in hearing testimony
that confirmed this. Interview, May 7, 1971.
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despite the fact that they knew the police and some citizens
would object.

What the Council failed to comprehend,

eighteen months later, was the depth of feeling and very
real fear of change in existing norms that this whole

incident had evoked.

The Commission met several additional times that
month to hear testimony of those who had witnessed the
theater fracas.

This was done after much discussion by

the Commission, in executive session, of the disastrous
The Commission members

public hearing with the police.

generally seemed to feel that the Commission had been by

passed publicly in this whole matter.

Mr. Gross said that

the lines of communication between the city administration

and the Commission seemed closed; if these lines were open,
he remarked, the Commission would have been notified of the
officers 1

situation.

statement and could have been prepared for the
He thought the effectiveness of the Commission

had been nullified by Mr. Ewing’s statement, which seemed

to indicate the case was closed.

Q

Mr. McKinney of the State Commission was concerned
that the Commission make the city administration aware of

the depth of anti-police feeling in the Negro community.
He thought the Commission should document the feeling of

the community because this is the background against which
the police work:

"The city administration has to take some

^Commission Minutes, executive session, January 4, 1966.
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positive action rather than just denying allegations.

The

Commission has a real right to inquire into the details of

what actually happened. ..IO

Mr. Chamberlain of the State Commission indicated

that Negroes believe there is discrimination against them by

the police department; they believe there is police brutality;
this belief makes for reality.

He said that the city must

understand that the Negro has no confidence whatever in the

police force and that the depth of this distrust must be
exposed so that the city may take some positive steps, such
as better police training.

Mrs . Hite Compton, a Commission member who taught at
Huntington High School, said she had been visited all day by
students who exhibited great feelings of helplessness.

They

do not condone hoodlumism, she said, but they feel they have
no protection, no redress.

Many told her young people merely

standing on a street corner would be berated by the police. 11
At this point, Mrs. Robert Emerson, a lawyer’s wife,

and one of those who had worked for Council-Manager govern-

ment in Huntington, defended the police position in not
speaking in public session before the Commission.

Most of

the Commission members agreed with her and tried to decide
how to obtain more specific information.

Mr. Smith tried to

push for a civilian review board, but the members finally

10Ibid.
Ibid.
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agreed to the following statement:

The public hearings relative to the Keith Albee
incident left the Civil Rights Commission with
insufficient information to make a fair and impartial
finding in this matter.
Out of respect for the rights of the police officers
involvedr the Commission will continue its hearings in
closed session, in order to hear all sides of the issue.

Of utmost concern to the Civil Rights Commission and
directly involved in the matter, is the integrity and
respect of our Police Department by all segments of the
12
At a closed meeting of the Commission a Negro girl

appeared who provided eyewitness testimony for Luther Wade’s
story of the policeman drawing the gun.

Mr. Chamberlain

brought up the fact that this was the same officer involved
in the gun pulling incident at Marshall the previous May.
At this point the City Manager and the Chief of

Police arrived and the discussion centered on the police
operation methods and police training.

Both indicated that

there is need for training in crowd control.

The police

department also said that they had not received information

that there was to be trouble at the theaterr although this

seemed to be general information among the young people.
Captain Azel Bryant said the ’’trouble" goes back to

12Ibid. Several Commission members still resent the
embarrassment caused by the public hearings being conducted
in this manner. Mr. Smith engineered the hearings without
their consent, and they felt the public.hearing was a real
tactical error that resulted in the demise of the Commission.
Interviews with Mr. Garner, Dr. Paul D. Stewart,.Mrs.
Emerson, and Mr. Roger Gross all mentioned this incident in
this manner if not in these words.
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incidents the previous summer at a public pool that involved
name-calling which were continued at the stadium with the

boys trying to get even; rocks were thrown at cars.

Police

did not create the problems, he said; the problems come from
both sides.

1 o

After a subcommittee heard other witnesses, the
Commission issued a report in which it detailed the events in

the theater and then offered the following recommendations:

1.
The police department should seek ways to
perform . . . which will lessen rather than increase
racial tensions which exist in the community such as
a) institute a program of instruction in fundamental
human relations for its members and for all departments
and agencies which represent the city in its relations
with the general citizenry,

b) make a concerted effort to make the department
personnel reflect the composition of the community,

c) ensure that the management of large public
functions have adequate police personnel present at
such functions, and
d) ensure in the case of general public disorder or
disturbance that a general over-all plan be followed and
that a chain of command be established and identifiable
in the handling of such disorder.

2.
The Commission recommends that representatives
of the Negro community and members of the Police Depart
ment combine forces to open channels of communication
for better understanding by exchanging opinions on
a) making the police more aware of the problems,
needs, and desires of the Negro community; and

b) providing methods of guiding youth to greater
respect for proper authority.

^commission Minutes, special meeting, January 11,

1966.
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3.
The Commission recommends the adoption of an
ordinance enlarging the responsibility for the Human
Rights Commission to improve intergroup relations in
the city of Huntington and empowering it to hear
complaints of discrimination, to initiate and carry
out programs of public education in these matters and
to work toward greater quality of opportunity for all
citizens in the areas of housing, employment, and

education.14
At the February 1 special meeting,, the Commission

also discussed the request of the City Manager that they

act to prevent a recurrence of this kind of incident at a
scheduled rock and roll show.

It was decided that Commission

members would try to reach the young people to "exercise
mature judgement and understanding, [in order to] avert
what could be an unfortunate and regrettable incident. nl5

The city government was willing to have the Commission act
to prevent situations, but less willing to act on the

Commission1 s recommendations .
The City Council heard a report on the incident from

Councilman Garner in which he saw his role quite differently
than did the Commission.

He said:

. . . the City Council is pursuing an honest effort
we muzt
must
to equally serve all of its reputable citizens, w-

14Report of the Huntington Human Rights Commission
on the New Year’s Eve incident at the Keith Albee theater,
adopted at a special meeting of the Commission, February 1,
1966.
l^Commission Minutes, February 1, 1966 . As it turned
out the show was canceled so no one had to act. Members of
the Commission did meet with the Superintendent of Schools
on February 3, but he told them he felt there was no racial
not certain
what the
problem in the schools; moreover, 1he
— was
---- ---school system’s role ought to be since the incidents had not
occurred on school property, nor were they school sponsored.
Commission Minutes, February 15, 1966 .
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acknowledge that the integration of Negroes in the
public, private and educational institutions has
not met the standards that many Negro citizens
desire.
Subsequently, this body must be willing to
take positive and firm steps toward guaranteeing
equality of law enforcement, equality of employment,
equality of advancement, and equality of opportunity.
In return, this body has the right to expect lines
of communications [sic] to be left open for the
Negro citizens to assist in accomplishing these
objectives by consulting with, advising and working
closely with City Council or their elected Councilmen.

. . . findings indicate a substantial lag in
police department training for situations in which
the police had not been previously confronted. Mr.
Ewing instituted remedial procedures.

. . . accounts indicate a complete disrespect for
police officers (inside the Keith Albee) and it is
understood, but not condoned, that the pressures of
the situation could have precipitated use of racial
epitaphs.
Relative to the charge of police brutality, Council
wishes to make these observations. Historically, any
pressure groups when under the surveillance of law
enforcement bodies find that a sympathetic public
reaction can more readily be attained by claiming
police brutality. Council admits that rather strong
measures were taken to control the throng at the Keith
Albee by approximately seventeen police officers. We
raise the question, What would you, as a police officer,
have done under similar circumstances? By evidence
submitted, we find that policemen in their directions
to citizens were ignored and taunted. Why? Certainly
this disregard for law is objectionable to a great
majority of citizens. The general public is seldom
aware of citizens’ brutality and the Huntington Police
Department is frequently confronted with this. However,
giving credence to the claim, we find the City Manager
has instituted proper measures in order to equitably
enforce the laws.
The Councilman’s report then commented on some of

the major points in the report issued by the West Virginia
Human Rights Commission:

Most of the questions raised appear to us to be a
matter of judgmentr with a conclusion based on
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individuals who were faced with a decision. The .
policeman waving his gun and the assemblage of
cruisers in the Sixteenth Street area fall in this
category. . . .
This Council was unaware of the strong anti-police
feeling of the Negro community. The reports of police
mistreatment on the occasion are refuted by numerous
volunteer statements that indicate to Council that
the officers present were left with no alternative
during the melee . . . the riot equipment was purchased
almost two years after being told it is a good deterrent
to crime.
We sincerely regret that it took the Keith Albee
incident to appraise this Council of the sentiment in
the Negro community about the police department and
the city administration.

. . . we not only strongly advise the staff to
actively recruit Negroes for city employment, integrate
all departments, discipline of not only police guilty
of discrimination, but other employees when they show
like treatment, review the training investigation and
all procedures of the police department. . . . Within
propriety, we will initiate steps to improve racial
tolerance among high school youth.
Our police department has been charged with police
brutality. This Council, in this report, has approved
recommendations, both of the staff and the two
Commissions, which we hope will prevent any future
such changes. We wish to point out that policemen are
employees of the public and provide twenty-four hout a
day service. Their’s is a hazardous occupation.
Presently, there are two members off duty. . . . Both
are victims of public brutality. 16

This public statement is carefully hedged to back

the police while pledging to do better if the charges should
be true.

It is a statement that attempts to uphold both

sides r but the tome of the statement is such that the police

men are the "we" and the Negro community is the "they."

The

16Minutes of the Huntington City Council, February
This statement was received by the Council without
19, 1966.
comment.
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Councilman felt the attack on the police department was also

an attack on the city administration, and, therefore, he
defended both the Council and the department, since to defend

the Council, he felt he had to defend the police.

The

Commission members were understandably concerned about the
lack of any but casual mention of the work of the Huntington

Commission, and certainly no word about the investigation

that they had conducted.
Commission put it,

ii

As the last Chairman of the

The citizens didnft look to the

Commission for guidance on these questions . . . we didn1t

carry much weight in the minds of the public, or perhaps
around City Hall, either . .

..17

The Commission had been set up to filter racial
conflict before it reached the public decision-making arena,

and when the Commission attempted to deal with the very real

problem in other but a quiet, behind-the-scenes manner that
accomplished nothing except to keep the problems quiet, it

suddenly lost any legitimacy it might have had.

Mr. Smith

and his use of an incident to dramatize the problems of

discrimination and racial tension mobilized the bias of the
white community to defend the police and their handling of
the incident and to try to tie the incident itself up to

"hoodlum" elements, a general disrespect for law and order,

-L^Tape of radio broadcast on WMUL, the Marshall
University radio station. May 11/ 1968. This tape contains
interviews with Dr. Stewart, Mrs. E. Wyatt Payner and others
on the work of the Commission and the coming ordinance vote.
Hereafter referred to as WMUL tape.

ii
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or the necessity of a show of force to prevent worse trouble.

The event also served to polarize the community.

In

a statement before City Council, Jack Darrah, a sometime

pamphleteer for those who opposed the city administration,
made the following statements:

If we can accept eye-witness accounts of reliable
spectators, the Keith Albee incident was a revelation.
. . . our policemen (were) under constant physical
attack by black and white hoodlums of both sexes. . . .
It was indeed a miracle that order was restored, and
because of the methods used to accomplish the task, a
blanket of fear now hangs over Huntington. Why?
Simply because you gentlemen knowingly permitted the
Human Rights Commission with its NAACP overtones to
publicly imply that the riot could have been a race
incident and that civil rights of certain Negroes had
been violated. In effect, you allowed a Negro oriented
group to take over the full investigation of an incident
that was basically one of law enforcement, and as a
result, many whites are now convinced that City Hall is
under the domination of a minority which numbers less
than six percent of our total population! . . . Why
are we concerned with such an implication?
Mr. Darrah goes on to quote from an article on crime
in the cities in Fortune magazine, in which police brutality

is shown to be unprovable and conviction impossible, and
that charges of brutality impaired police morale and hindered

recruitment.

crime:

He quotes the Fortune article’s statistics on

"Negroes commit a greatly disproportionate share of

violent crimes in the United States.

In 1964, Negroes,

numbering 11 percent of the population, accounted for 52

percent of reported arrests for murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault."

He asks, what can we expect if the Negro becomes the dominant

force in society?

He answers with a quote from an African
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diplomat in Rhodesia "For the whites in Rhodesia there is
only one solution.

Let them leave the country—the sooner

the better—or perish1"
And he asks:

Is it any wonder that white citizens are frightened
with what is now taking place in City Halil It isn’t
that any of us do not want to extend all rights and
privileges to all members of the Negro race, but it is
a fact that we demand that they all obey the laws which
now govern our society. If we obey them, we—the
whites—have the right to expect Negroes to also hew
the line! But after witnessing members of Council
being browbeaten on several occasions by various people,
we are steadily losing confidence in their ability to
cope with the situation.
Mr. Darrah then listed alleged incidents of beating,

rapes , rock-throwing, muggings, etc., that had occurred

recently in the 16th Street area, and asked why the events
had been suppressed.

He stated that the white community

resents the militant attitude of the Human Rights Commission.
The problem, he said, is with a minority of Negroes who are

troublemakers who are hurting the Negro cause and setting it
back many years.

It is groups like the NAACP, he said, that

force us to treat Negroes as a race and not as individuals.
"Continue to use force," he warned Negroes, "and we will

reply with a far greater one.

If you continue to allow the

present organizations to represent you, you can expect a

white group to develop whose number will dwarf yours by
comparison.

We don’t want this to happen

do you?"

He

admonishes further:
Councilman George Garner■ does not speak for the white
community as a whole, I1 have no objection to any Negro
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being hired in City Hall—provided he or she can meet
the standards required. But to say that all depart
ments must be integrated simply because he is partial
to Negroes, is to me . . . discrimination against my
color.
It must be remembered that whenever a Negro
is given a job, a white has lost out.
Mr. Darrah then ends his speech with a charge that
Council has allowed the Human Rights Commission to establish

precedent in law and order enforcement:
We are here tonight to explain that responsible
citizens—black and white—do not, and will not
condone this attitude ... on your part. Unless
Council takes immediate steps to enforce law and
order, regardless of race, and publicly states this
intention, the people will use whatever means
necessary to see that this wish is carried out. 18

Racial tension reached the decision-making stage in

Huntington, but the City Council made no real decisions other

than to institute better police training procedures.

1 Q

This incident had the same kind of effect on the city
of Huntington that the President’s Commission on Civil Dis

orders later found to be true in the large urban riots in

1967.

The President’s Commission found that these civil

disorders "involved Negroes acting against local symbols of

18Statement by Jack Darrah to Huntington City Council,
February 19, 1966.
(Mimeographed.)
19It should be noted that at this time there was
considerable trouble in the police department and a new man
had been brought in to try and improve police procedures.
The force had been accused of being involved in politics,
members had been indicted in bribery, robbery, and wire
tapping investigations, so their troubles were not only in
the area of race relations. Interviews, George Garner,
Edward Ewing, Paul Pancake and Roger Gross. Mr. Gross made
the observation that police salaries and the kind of work
will always attract men from the community level who show
the greatest discrimination.
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white American Society, authority, and property. .

I!

There were "prior incidents which increased tensions that

involved police actions. .

rt

There are three levels of

intensity of Negro complaints, and the first level involves

police practices, unemployment and underemployment, and
inadequate housing.

"Actions to ameliorate Negro grievances

have been limited and sporadic; . . . they have not
significantly reduced tensions.”

Moreover, "the city’s

formal grievance mechanism was regarded by Negroes as

ineffective and generally ignored.”

And then this indictment:

"White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive

. At the base of this mixture are . .

mixture.

. most

bitter fruits of white racial attitudes:
Pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment,
education and housing have resulted in the continuing
exclusion of great numbers of Negroes from the benefits
of economic progress. 20

These statements made in the Kerner report had been
made in many meetings of the Human Rights Commission in
Huntington from 1962 to 1967, but it seemed no one was
listening.

Mr. Smith and members of the State Commission

often referred to the racist attitudes prevalent in Huntington

but the other Commission members had been more willing to

believe that education and encouragement could help solve the
problem.

Mr. Darrah’s statement, while probably not generally

2^"Summary of Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders," commonly called the Kerner
Report, and hereafter referred to by that title (New York:
Bantam Books, 1968).
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articulated in such strong language, did represent a

significant opinion in Huntington.

The Keith Albee incident

served to bring all sides of the problem out in the open.

CHAPTER VI

FROM INCIDENT TO ORDINANCE
It seemed most of the Commission’s public exposure
came through its efforts in racial incidents over which it

had no control.

Although the Commission had been in

existence in Huntington for three and a half yearsr most

persons had heard little or nothing about it until the Keith
Albee incident of January 1, 1966.

Before this time the

Commission had taken the role of arbitrator or friendly

persuader.

In the Keith Albee incident the Commission took

the role of advocate and found that instead of being the

personification of good, it was fighting an unpopular fight
with another city department, the police force.

The City

Manager and the City Council upheld the police and thus cut

their support of the Huntington Commission.

This led the

Commission to seek status within the city administration

that would put it on a par with other city departments, and

perhaps give it a more equal footing with the police and other
city departments.

The police department was able to mobilize

citizen support in its disagreement with the Commission, and

thus carry the day and stifle the Commission’s hopes for
equality for almost two years.

While the Keith Albee incident galvanized the
96
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Commission members to take concrete action concerning the
Commission ’ s status and structure, there had been considerable

discussion previously about the purpose of the Commission and
its proper functions.

Reverend Smith and the CIP tried to

give the Commission a more public role.

Mr, Smith had

instituted the public-meeting concept before the Keith Albee
incident and used it to focus attention on problems brought
to the Commission by the CIP.

But the Commission was able to

provide only a public forum for problems of discrimination —

symbolic rather than material rewards.
In September, 1965, Reverend Smith resigned as
Chairman of the Commission, saying he felt he could better

devote his time to ACTION and the NAACP.

Both the Commission

members and the City Manager expressed their dismay and asked

Mr. Smith to continue as Chairman, which he consented to do. 1

1-The Federal poverty program co-opted Black leader
ship in Huntington. The structure of the Community Action
agency also served to diffuse Black demands. Southwestern
Community Action initially involved three counties, in which
Huntington was the only Black community. This caused
formation of ACTION, a semi-autonoumous delegate agency,
which managed the Black part of this coalition. ACTION was
tolerated in Southwestern because it was necessary to show
Black involvement in order to qualify for Federal money, and
not much supervision or interference was given to the "Black
share" of the total funding. At various times Black leader
ship was active in symbolic as well as real leadership
control.
However, after the passage of the Green Amendment
in 1967, the Cabell County Court took.responsibility.for the
local community action program and initiated a sweeping
study, particularly of the fiscal controls. within the agency.
When fiscal methods proved not in accord with accepted
business practices, Southwestern was reorganized and now
provides merely centralized bookkeeping for poverty funds,
most of which are contracted out to the delegate agencies.
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The next month the Commission again discussed its

status and voted to appoint a subcommittee to meet with the
Mayor, the City Attorney, and the City Manager to "define

more clearly the activities of the Commission."

Councilman

Garner attended this meeting and expressed concern over the

Commission’s pessimistic view regarding its operation.

He

indicated he felt that relations between the Commission and
the city administration had been good.2
In November, the Chairman appointed a subcommittee
to work out specifics and define the purposes and functions

of the Commission. 3
it had not yet met. 4

In December, the subcommittee reported
The Keith Albee incident occurred on

January 1, and the Commission was occupied with testimony

on January 3, 4, and 11.

At the regular meeting of January

18, 19 66, the subcommittee presented its report, which Mr.
Gross, the chairman, explained was basically a plan for

internal structure of the Commission, since, in his opinion,
the lack of organizational structure had weakened the

handling of the Keith Albee incident.

5

^Commission Minutes, October 19, 1965. Mr. Garners
comment seems to indicate that at this time the City Council
members thought the Commission was doing exactly what it was
set up to do. They did not understand the need or were
unwilling to grant more power to the Commission. They
expected the Commission to deflect demands, not make decisions,
and certainly not make demands on Council in behalf of other
groups.
3 Commission Minutes, November 16, 1965.
4 Commission Minutes, December 21, 1965.
5 Commission Minutes, January 18, 1966.

Mr. Gross and
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The subcommittee report proposed creation of the

Commission by ordinance which would define its powers and

duties.

The subcommittee also recommended a set of by-laws

defining the working rules of the Commission.

Discussion

centered on whether the commission should have the power of

subpoena and whether such power would be legal.

The

Commission finally voted to delete subpoena power, and the

subcommittee was instructed to meet with the City Manager
and the City Attorney to draft the ordinance.
The meeting with the city officials was held, but

because the section on subpoena had not been deleted from

the sample ordinance copies, discussion at this meeting also

centered on the legalities of granting subpoena power to the
Commission.7'

At its regular February meeting the Commission
discussed the by-laws which named officers, delineated their
duties, and set up standing committees, including an

Mrs. Phillips, who were members of this subcommittee, said
that the Commission members were very concerned about , the
Chairman's handling of the Keith Albee incident and wished
to have by-laws to prevent a similar situation. Interviews,
Mrs. Phillips, April 9, 1971; and Mr. Gross.

6Ibid.
^Commission Minutes, February 1, 1966. The city law
director later filed an opinion with the City Manager in.
which he said "the authority to investigate and . inquire into
all matters of concern to the city or its inhabitants" did
not include the power to subpoena and require testimony under
oath. He cited several cases and the West Virginia Code,
stating that the power of subpoena is not a delegable power.
Memo, E. Henry Broh to Edward A. Ewing, February 8, 1966 .
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executive committee to set the meeting agenda and make

policy recommendations to the whole Commission.

The by

laws were approved after some discussionr and the Commission
voted to ask the Mayor to put discussion of the Commission

ordinance on the Council agenda.8

PRECIPITATING FACTORS IN THE
MOBILIZATION OF BIAS

The Commission’s actions in behalf of the Negro
community in the Keith Albee incident led to a general

mobilization of bias against the Commission.

Mr. Darrah

attacked both the Commission and the Council/ and the police
department was defensive about the police brutality charges
stemming from the incident.

The Council, caught in the middle, was also concerned
about the Commission’s report on the Keith Albee incident

and was generally ambivalent about the work of the Commission.

When Reverend Smith again resigned the Commission chairman-

ship in March, no one urged him to reconsider. and Dr. Paul
Stewart, a Marshall University professor, became chairman.
In April the Commission heard more allegations of

police brutality, this time from Mr. C. M. Gray.

While the

Commission took no action beyong asking for a report of the
occurrence, this action did not help the Commission’s

^Commission Minutes, February 15, 1966 .
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already poor relations with the police department.9

The

Council was becoming more and more concerned about the rift
between the Commission and the police departmentr so Mayor

Robert Hinerman requested the Commission to consider the
appointment of a police officer to the Commission. 10

The

suggested appointment was discussed in May and June by the
Commission r but it was decided that it would not be a wise

idea since it might intimidate persons who wished to appear
before the Commission.H

Reverend Smith tried to push the

Commission to initiate meetings between police personnel and
the Negro communityr as had been suggested in the
Commission’s report on the Keith Albee incident, but the

^Commission Minutes, April 19, 1966. Mr. Gray
objected to the treatment he received when apprehended for a
traffic violation by Patrolman Linville. He said he was
subjected to an "uncalled for public search." Mr. Gray also
objected to being treated in a "highly disrespectful and unAmerican manner." Mr. Gray's letter detailing his complaint
was dated April 6, and on April 13, the Police Board of
Inquiry and Recommendations found the allegations were not
justified and Patrolman Linville had acted in accord with
proper police practice. The police report included the
finding that Mr. Gray was indeed "frisked" but this was just
standard police practice [for traffic violations?]; other
officers testified Patrolman Linville was not belligerent.
This police board had been instituted as a direct result of
the Keith Albee affair to hear allegations of misconduct.
directed at the police department. It was hoped that this
board would hear police-related complaints instead of the
to Edward A. Ewing, April 6,
Commission. Letter, C. M. Gray
(
1966. ]Report of the Police Board of Inquiry and Recommendation to the Chief of Police, April 14, 1966 .
^Commission Minutes, April 19 , 1966 .

■^Commission Minutes, May 17, 1966; June 21, 1966 .

11
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Chairman referred the request to the newly established sub

committee on community tensions.12
It was July before the City Council formally

discussed the Commission ordinance in a caucus session.

The

Council requested several changes and returned it to the
City Attorney for redrafting.

The discussion centered on

Commission functions in relation to the police department.

and the City Manager was quoted as saying he didn't want the
Commission turned into a civilian police review board. 13

This newspaper report of the Council discussion on the
Commission 1s status and the impending ordinance increased

the efforts to mobilize community bias against the Commission.
One factor was the police chief’s opposition.

The

day after Council consideration of the ordinance he expressed

his reservations:
If the ordinance directly or indirectly gives the
Human Rights Commission power to investigate charges
of civil rights violations for police brutality, I
am definitely opposed.
As Mr. J. Edgar Hoover has said, the police
executive must have full responsibility for the.
performance, discipline, and control of his officers.

The same news article stated that the proposed
ordinance would "not only boost the prestige of the Commission
..15 The police

but also broaden its investigative powers.

^commission Minutes, May 17, 1966 .

13 Hunting ton Herald Dispatch, July 12, 1966, p. 9.
1 ^Huntington Herald Dispatch, July 13, 1966, p. 1.
15Ibid.
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chief then sent a memorandum to members of Counc i1 expre s s ing

these same thoughts and stating that he thought the proposed
ordinance could be reasonably interpreted in such a way that
the Commission might develop into a civilian police review

board,.

,,

maybe not today, but sometime in the future."

He

pointed out that citizens who believe their civil rights
have been violated have recourse to the local office of the

FBI, which will forward its findings to the Department of

Justice for further consideration.

He also mentioned that

the department had established its own board to investigate
complaints of misconduct by police officers.
Chief Kleinknecht went on to explain that there was

no need for an additional "untrained" body to conduct
investigations .

Such a body, he said, would harass depart

ment members and be used as a threat by law violators so

that a police officer might avoid arrests if he thought the
Human Rights Commission might investigate the matter.

He

cited an FBI report on riots in cities that had civilian
review boards where "the police were so careful to avoid
improper conduct that they were virtually paralyzed.

The

rioters were thereby emboldened to resist and completely
defy the efforts of the police to restore order.

,,16

The memo was accompanied by expressions of support
from commanding officers within the department, and a copy

1 ^Memorandum from G. M. Kleinknecht, Chief of Police,
to Members of City Council, July 15, 1966 .
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of a syndicated column of David Lawrence was attached in
which it was pointed out that civilian review boards made up
of minority groups are apt to vote their prejudices and
emotions rather than according to the facts in the case. 17

The six—page memo played on community fears of riots and
thus mobilized community biases against giving the Commission

the power to investigate police practices.
Chief Kleinknecht was helped in his efforts by Jack

Darrah, who devoted the July 11 issue of the Spotlight to a
story of Patrolman Linville and his run-in with a group of
Negroes on 16th Street in which he pulled his gun "when a

man reached toward the open window of the police cruiser."

Patrolman Linville is then quoted:

Those people have absolutely no respect for the
law, nor do they have any for the uniform of the one
organization whose job it is to protect the public.
If there was any way to do it and make the charges
stick, I’d swear out warrants for everyone involved.
Mr. Darrah then castigated the Supreme Court which, he
charged, had taken away a "policeman’s most powerful weapon

1!

since he could no longer arrest a man for questioning, under
fear of false arrest suits.

He asks rhetorically, "Would

you take a chance if you were a policeman?

.,18

In the following issue, Mr. Darrah devoted most of

17Ibid.
18 Spot light, No. 9, July 11, 1966 . Mr. Darrah
generally limited his attacks to the city administration.
He had previously opposed administration fiscal policies,
especially attempts to obtain additional revenue.

I
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the newspaper to attacks on the ordinance, which he claimed
would make the Commission a "legalized vigilante committee."

He informed his readers:

Not only is the Human Rights Commission out to
dominate City Hall, it also hopes to gain city
wide power to investigate the activities of
'community organizations, labor organizations,
fraternal and benevolent associations and other
groups in Huntington, in programs devoted to
eliminating group prejudice, intolerance, bigotry,
and discrimination. 1 If the ordinance passes, a
lodge can no longer blackball an applicant; women’s
organizations must throw open their doors to any
applicant—just as long as he can pay the tab.
Nobody can be free to pick and choose his friends —
or enemies.
Mr. Darrah adds that everyone is a bigot by definition since

the dictionary says a bigot is one who is obstinately or

intolerantly devoted to his own church, party or opinion. 19
By the next issue a letters to the editor column had
been instituted and several letters were printed attacking

the proposed Human Rights ordinance.

A letter from Mrs. E.

Wyatt Payne was presented in an obvious effort to mobilize

community bias:^°

. . . City Council considers making the Human Rights
Commission a LEGAL arm of the government. This is
preposterous and perhaps comes in the category of
the communist policy of ’legal illegality.1 The
members of the Human Rights Commission were never
voted for by the citizens of Huntington, therefore,
by what stretch of the imagination or ’legal procedure’
could they--by arbitrary action of the duly elected

19Ibid.

^Mrs. ]Payne is a noted Huntington clubwoman who
—•---------, Her husband
lectures nationwide about the Communist
menace,
is in the real estate business.
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Council become a LEGAL arm of our city government.
It cannot!
Mr. Kleinknecht correctly said such action is
not legal and is to be commended for . . . [protecting]
our police department from investigation by a civilian
review board. However, . . . where does that leave
the rest of the community? Are other arms of govern
ment, private clubs, businesses and private property
to be left helpless and vulnerable to investigation
without due process of law? Actually, the community,
as a whole, through their elected Council, should be
protecting the police and themselves from such an
encroachment on lives and property.
Council . . . should remember that the communists
started this anti-law movement when they said publicly
in California, ’We declare War on Law Enforcement. 1
It is their policy and program. Shall we aid and abet
the enemy or protect the rights of all citizens in
Huntington, including the police department? If it is
not legal for them, the police, it is not legal for
anybody.
Act accordingly! 21

Mr. Darrah, Mrs. Payne, and Senator Byrd echoed the
feelings of many of their fellow citizens.

People in

Huntington were concerned with the threat of riots, police
protection, and the danger of the communist menace.

They

were also concerned with the more subtle issue of private
property rights.

Many people have most of their assets tied

up in their homes, and the threat that Negroes moving in the
area might hurt this investment was implicit in every appeal

21Spotlight, No. 10, n.d. In the August 11 Spot
light (No. 11), Mr. Darrah proudly notes that the Linville
story had been printed in the Congressional Record by West
Virginia Senator Robert Byrd with this comment: "In these
days of civil rights ferment, riots and street violence,
growing crime rates, and U. S. Supreme Court decisions which
straitjacket the police throughout the country, it may be of
interest . . . to call attention to an incident which
happened recently in Huntington, W. Va. as printed in the
Spotlight, a weekly newspaper. . .
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to property rights.

Moreover, Huntingtonians were concerned

about Negro children going to school with their children,

and about Negroes joining their clubs and churches or even

eating in the same restaurants with them.

These were not

familiar practices in Huntington and the people were not

going to encourage them.

Those opposing the ordinance played

on these fears in order to mobilize opposition to the
Commission’s effort to improve its status.

The mobilization

of bias forced the City Council to shelve the Commission
ordinance at this time. 2 2

Similar fears were found in a study by Auerbach and
Walker of political trust and racial ideology.

They found:

The desires of blacks for symbolic reassurances of
good faith are becoming increasingly difficult to grant
because of mounting white resentment. Symbolic gestures
have fanned the fires of white resentment. 23

Murray Edelman, in his provocative book, The Symbolic
Uses of Politics, points out that some form of symbolic

reassurance is needed to fulfill a symbolic goal (e.g., the
Commission goal of eliminating prejudice) .

This may be done

by offering occasional incremental increases in benefits or

22The Council was attempting to pass a capital
improvements levy that summerr and Mr. Darrah and others
were opposing the levy as well as the Commission ordinance.
In the August 2 7 issue of the Spotlight he links the levy
vote, urban renewal, and the ordinance as part of a plot to
"force Negroes to leave their neighborhoods in search of new
•
•' One suspects the Council hoped
homes all over Huntington."
it might blunt some of the opposition to the levy by
abandoning the Commission ordinance.
22Joel D. Auerbach and Jack L. Walker, "Political
Trust and Racial Ideology," American Political Science
Review, LXIV (December, 1970), 1216.
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by relying on vague assertions that the objective is being

achieved.

In the political arena, groups remain active

despite the realization of tangible benefits for which the

groups were first formed to achieve:
The Negro’s claim to specific social, economic, and
political benefits and demands for an equitable voice
for constituents in Congress and for specific controls
over elective officials continue as major themes in
American politics. They must do so, for in this more
general form they constitute formal categories which
represent important values in our culture . . .24

According to this analysis, political restiveness

occurs when the state is not symbolically aligned with those

who feel threatened. 2 5

In this case the City Council in

Huntington was caught between two such groups.

In trying to

provide symbolic reassurance to Negroes in Huntington, the
Council was attacked by those whom Edelman characterizes as
"vigilante groups" made up of people who suffer from anomie,
or lack of symbolic reassurance.

They deal with their fears

and justify these feelings by finding a conspiracy of
hostile elements.

This outlook is basically pessimistic in

that even victory would not produce a better situation, but
only remove a potential threat.

Victory, moreover, never

occurs since the fear is based not on observable conditions,

but on an emotional concern with an enemy difficult to

24Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 164-65 .
25ibid., p. 167.
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identifyr one which pervades society and prevents the

restoration of a former social order that the vigilantes, in
this world, can only dream about.26

It is the fears of the

prosperous, the established and those who identify with a

real or imagined social order in which their norms would be

6Ibid. , pp. 167-68. An example of this kind of
reminiscence are the remarks of Catherine Bliss Enslow about
social life in the city for the centennial edition of the
Huntington newspaper:
Entertaining was done in the homes. ... In those
days all the families had many servants who took pride
in providing the most beautiful food and service. . . .
The servants were always 'on call' because they
actually lived on the property of those for whom they
worked. They were clothed, fed and cared for by their
employers and paid well too. ... As Huntington began
to grow the social elegance continued but the formal
home parties disappeared. . . . Much of this was and is
due to the fact that the families do not have the
servants they once had and many cannot afford them if
they could get them. Huntington Herald-Advertiser,
Centennial Edition, July 11, 1971, pp. Hl, 2.

Compare this nostalgia with Senator Byrd's speech
on the Senate floor in 196 7, demanding that rioters no longer
be handled with kid gloves. He spoke of his own poor child
hood in a poverty-stricken family during the Depression; no
one in the mining community where he grew up rioted and
looted because they were poor. Then he made this statement,
which is similar to Miss Enslow's longings: "Some would
want us to believe that these rioters want jobs, I happen
to believe that most of them . . . are allergic to work.
Look at the classified section in the Washington paper . . .
one will find advertisement after advertisement calling for
domestic help. Most of these domestics can get $12.00 for
8 hours work, their transportation and lunch provided, but
too many of the employable women do not want to work . . .
Many of these people would rather draw welfare checks than
go to work." Speech on the Senate floor, July 25 , 19 67,
U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. (1967) ,
CIII, 20158-20163.
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legitimate that make up the movement.27

In terms of the

nondecision model, this group would be one that seeks to
uphold the status quo or would prefer a return to an earlier
system in which their norms were operative.28

As Edelman

explains:

Fundamental norms as created by reference groups
persist, leading interested groups to claim increasing
embody, How fast
increments of the values the norms embody.
successive levels of benefit are sought or how
intensely deprivations are resisted hinges upon what
is legitimized and upon what is made to appear
possible.
Political acts and settings, leadership,
and language all influence legitimations and
assumptions about possibility.29

Bachrach and Baratz apply their nondecision model to
the same phenomenon, explaining that prevailing community

norms and biases as well as institutional barriers prevent

7 7'Edelman,

P- 168.

28Edelman compares the vigilante's concern for
maintaining the status quo to the concern of other groups
interested in mass action in overturning the status quo to
achieve a new order based on the values of the group
concerned. The opposition groups, supporters of rebellion,
political strikes, and farmers' demonstrations, compare
their current living standards with better ones. Men do not
revolt, he explains, when they are destitute or ground down,
but after they have experienced improvement in their living
standards so that it becomes reasonable to assume that
improvement is normal and to be expected. They then begin
to take as their reference groups not their peers, but those
better off than they. There is restiveness and revolt if
there has not been assurance that normal government pro
cedures will elevate them to the status of the new reference
groups. These were the two groups that the City Council in
Huntington was trying to appease at the same time, the
vigilantes who wish to maintain the status quo or return to
a former order (Darrah and Mrs. Payne) and Blacks who
represented the political strike group and wished some sort
of reassurance from the Council.
2^Edelman, P- 173.
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demands of some groups from reaching the decision-making

arena.

The ethos theory of Banfield and Wilson, or its

application by Lineberry and Fowler, shows how political
institutions filter the process of conversion in a decision
making system.

All of these studies indicate that when

there is a demand for change, there is a concomitant

mobilization of bias in favor of the status quo, and it was
this mobilization of bias that worked against any positive

change in the racial situation in Huntington in the 1960’s.
THE COMMISSION REACTION

The Huntington Commission was most discouraged
following the City Council’s failure to act on the ordinance
proposal.

They were concerned with the references to police

review board, and incensed at the police opposition.

In a

Commission discussion, Mrs. Roberta Emerson indicated that

the reason for creation of the Commission was to take the
pressure off Council in the area of human relations and the
Council would be ill-advised not to give the Commission

certain responsibilities and the authority to carry them

out; if a Commission had no authority, all the complaints

relating to human relations would fall on the Council.

Mrs.

Phillips raised the question of the need of Councilmen for

more background on Human Rights agencies.

Members felt it

would be helpful to be able to sit with Council in
consideration of the ordinance in order to give the

112

philosophy behind it.

There was also discussion of the

Spotlight stories.30
In November, Dr. Stewart wrote the Mayor stating the

Commission was at a very low point as only three people

attended the November meeting.

He said he felt the

"uncertainty in status" and the lack of new appointments
were contributing factors.

He asked that the Mayor take

some action so that the Commission would not be written off
as insignificant and not pertinent to the times. 31

In December, the Huntington Business and Professional
Men’s Club, a Negro organization, petitioned City Council to

deal with the continuing problem of the police and the Negro
community.

The club asked that police officers treat Negro

citizens with courtesy and "reasonable treatment"; that
"over-policing and excess force" cease to be used in the

Negro areas; and that a liaison group be established between

the Negro populace and the police.

It did not condone the

provocative behavior of young people toward the police, but
felt that police conduct was encouraging such behavior.-1^
This letter was a result of rock-throwing incidents in the

16th Street area, and indicated that middle-class Negroes

3°commission Minutes, July 19, 1966 .
■^Letter, Paul D. Stewart to R. 0. Robertson, Jr.,
November 28, 1966.

^Letter, Huntington Business and Professional Men's
Club to City Council, December 10 , 1966 .
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felt there was no change in police-community relations,
despite a previous announcement that such a program was

being instituted in the police department.

In another rock

throwing incident a police car was hit and the officer got
out of his car with his shotgun.

When the rocks continued

to be hurled the policement fired his shotgun in the air
which dispensed the crowd.^3

Another Negro brought a charge of police brutality
before the Commission.

He claimed he was being harassed

because he dated white girls.

The man was related to one of

the Commission members and the City Manager expressed concern
that the Commission heard testimony before a court hearing

on the case.

The policemen involved also felt the Commission

hearing was unwarranted interference. 34

Incidents like these

further widened the breech between the Commission and the
police.
The Commission was also concerned with another

incident on the Marshall campus.

This one involved a letter

printed in the Parthenon, the Marshall student newspaper, in

^commission Minutes, April 18, 1967 . There are.
repeated instances of this kind of complaint and Commission
discussions of them in many Commission minutes. A report of
the National Crime Commission in 1967 criticized the police
for using firearms too frequently, arresting Negroes for
offenses for which they would not arrest whites; and for
It
unjustified searches and seizures of minority groups.. It^
but
a
reflection
of
seemed the problems in Huntington were 1---the larger problem throughout the country. Huntington Herald
Dispatch, April 30, 1967, p. 2.
^commission Minutes, March 21, 1967; April 18, 1967.
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which derogatory remarks were made about Negroes over the

signature of Richard Lee Rockwell, the name of a well-known
facist who resided in Virginia.

The letter caused an uproar

both for the language used and the monstrous blunder on the
newspaper's part in letting it be printed.

A strict letter

policy was no sooner announced than a letter sent to

President Smith and signed by Joseph Slash, a Negro super
visor in the public school system, in which allegations of

discrimination on campus and especially by Marshall
professors was made, was published.

Mr. Slash immediately

denied any knowledge of the letter, and claimed his name had
been used without his permission.

The Commission discussed

the letters and the question of whether it could get
involved in what seemed strictly a University matter.

A

committee was appointed to express the Commission's concern

over the letters and request an investigation and report to

the Commission from the Marshall president, Dr. Stewart H.
Smith.35

As a direct result of this request, a representative
of the Marshall Human Relations Committee, Dr. John Shay,
Dean of Student Affairs, attended the next Commission
meeting and discussed the situation on the Marshall campus.

Dean Shay said that although the official University policy
is to welcome the Negro student, the students at Marshall

reflect the prejudice of the society from which they come;

■^commission Minutes, February 21, 1967.
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the core of social life on campus is centered in the
fraternities and sororities and these organizations do not
have any Negro members. 36

Dean Shay said that Negro students

had asked for a statement of policy regarding Negroes at
Marshall which he gave:
Ancestry is a criterion for neither admission nor
success at Marshall. Any student with a satisfactory
record of academic performance and social conduct will
be admitted to the University. Once admitted, every
student becomes a part of the University community.
As such he is encouraged to participate in the
activities of the community provided that such
participation does not hinder his academic work, The
total University environment is designed to expose
each student to a diversity of ideas and individuals.
Hence no student may be excluded from any activity
recognized by the University because of his ancestry. 37

Mr. Paul Pancake said the subcommittee appointed to meet
with President Smith had not met because Marshall seemed to

have dealt fully with the issue. 38

The Commission was not

involved in any other matter concerning the University.

THE STATE COMMISSION STEPS IN
In May there were racial incidents at Huntington

High School that the Board of Education could not ignore.

Over two hundred persons crowded the small Board meeting
room to protest the laxity of the school administration in
dealing with fighting and name-calling among white and Negro

^commission Minutes, March 21, 1967.

37The Parthenon, February 22, 1967, p. 1.
^commission Minutes, March 21, 1967.

I
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students at the school.

Chief Kleinknecht pledged the

police would strictly enforce the municipal loitering law in
the area around the school, and the School Board immediately
instituted strict disciplinary measures, including the

posting of men teachers in the halls, shortening the lunch
period, and expelling any student who loitered or "stirs up
trouble . "

The Board agreed to take under advisement the

problem of Negro participation in extracurricular activities,

but the principal concern was getting the students back in

school since absenteeism was double the usual number.

While

most of the school personnel termed the incidents behavioral
problems, representatives from both the State and City Human

Rights Commissions said they felt the racial aspect was the

principal factor.

The Huntington High principal said the

current tension apparently stemmed from a cross-burning

incident involving students, and the fact that there were no
Negro cheerleaders or majorettes. J

These disturbances and the subsequent tension
precipitated the direct intervention of the State Commission

3^Huntington Herald Dispatch, May 3, 1967. This
trouble in the "integrated" school bears out Allport’s
finding that casual contact between groups that is frequent
but superficial does not dispel prejudice, but increases it.
Prejudice screens and interprets the perceptions of out-group
members so that frequency of superficial contact strengthens
adverse mental associations. The two groups do not.
effectively communicate. This analysis shows that it takes
more than integration of facilities to dispel prejudice.
Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), PP- 251-52.
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into the racial situation in Huntington.

On May 2, a special

delivery letter from Carl Glatt, the Executive Director of
the State Human Rights Commission was sent to R. 0. Robert-

son, Jr., the Mayor, in which Glatt asked for a meeting the

following week with the Council, the City Manager, the
Police Chief, and one or two members of the Huntington Human
Rights Commission.

He listed reports that seemed to

indicate an accelerated pattern of overt violence in

Huntington and a concern with the widespread pattern of
discrimination in the total community life.

He mentioned

exploitation of Negroes, lack of employment opportunities,
and growing fear, dislike, and distrust of individual police

officers and the police in general.
H

Glatt warned that

there is trouble brewing in Huntington,” and he suggested

both short- and long-range plans should be explored to deal
with these problems.^0

The first in a series of meetings was held on May 8,
a second the following week, the third on June 13, and a

fourth on June 28.

At the first meeting the State Commission

presented information brought to its attention about

discrimination in Huntington, which they said was indicative
of the feelings of the persons involved.

City officials

asked for another meeting to answer the reports.

At this

meeting the State representatives strongly objected to the

40 Letter, Carl Glatt to R. 0. Robertson, Jr., May 2,

1967.
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defensive stance of the city representatives in which they
vindicated police practices and denied responsibility for

the problems in housing, recreation, schools and private
employment.

The State Executive Director later apologized

to Mayor Robertson for his strong reaction to what he felt

was an "incorrect refocusing of this presentation."^
Councilman John Damron felt there should be a meeting at
which members of the Negro community might present their

views, so at the June 13 meeting city officials heard and
spoke with selected members of the Negro communityr most of
them had never before exchanged words.

Mr. Glatt commented

that this opened up lines of communication that had not
existed previously, especially with some individuals whom

the police had classed as trouble-makers. 42

At the last

meeting, June 28, the State Commission members suggested
definite steps to explore employment opportunities for

Negroes, a concrete program to improve housing for Negroes,

and the establishment of a police community-relations

program.^3

Moreover, the State Commission warned:

It is our opinion that problems of race relations
in Huntington are more critical than in any other city
or area in West Virginia. Just under the surface there
continues to be smoldering discontent which can be
sparked into a major conflagration of racial violence

41Letter, Carl Glatt to R. 0. Robertson, Jr. May 24r
1967.

42Letter, Carl Glatt to R. 0. Robertson, Jr. June 26,

1967.
43 Huntington Advertiser, June 29, 1967, p. 13.
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by the least misunderstanding or relatively minor
street incident. There is a national atmosphere
conducive to racial outbreaks any place . . . where
the problems have been ignored such as they have
been ignored in Huntington, and this contagion can
quickly come to Huntington this summer unless official
^C^44n
^a^en
^he local level to mitigate against
This letter went on to suggest that Huntington

initiate both short- and long-range plans to improve race

relations.
As a direct result of these meetings, the West
Virginia Human Rights Commission prepared a summary of
suggestions for action by the City of Huntington.

It

indicated the overall feeling of frustration and ineffective

ness felt by members of the Huntington Human Rights Commission
stemming from "real or imaginary lack of interest on the part

of the Huntington City Council for not dealing with the
burgeoning problems with which it is faced.1'

The report

stated that the abortive attempt to provide full enforcement

powers by ordinance had led the Negro community into a steady
state of disrespect and lack of confidence in the local

Commission.

The recent problem-solving efforts of the

Commission were seen as "putting out of fires" rather than
an effective program of prevention and improvement.

It was suggested that the Commission be reconstituted
by ordinance with full investigatory and enforcement powers

44Letter, Carl Glatt to R. 0. Robertson, Jr., June 26,
1967.
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as well as provision for one full-time professional employee

and one full-time clerical employee.

It should have status.

The report demonstrated the dearth of Negroes
employed at any but service occupations in public employment

in the city.

A formal statement of non-discriminatory

employment policy was suggested.

It was also recommended

that the City Council and the local Commission sponsor a
series of meetings with top-level business leaders to
initiate moves to bring qualified Negroes and business
opportunities together with a well-advertised effort that

.
,
45
could .bring
change.

Recreation was mentioned, but the

State Commission felt it did not have enough information to
offer constructive suggestions in this area.

Housing

patterns revealed a ghetto situation in which much of the

housing was substandard.

Public housing was termed

inadequate and segregated except for minimum token inte-

gration.

It was suggested that the city initiate a vigorous

program of rehabilitation and attempt to locate new housing,

both public and private, to meet the needs of lower-income
and minority groups and to bring about integration of
neighborhoods in Huntington.

The situation in the public schools was detailed,
but the Commission said that its letter to the Board of
Education requesting an opportunity to discuss the situation

^Summary of Suggestions Relative to the City of
Huntington by the West Virginia Human Rights Commission,
June 26, 1967.
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had gone unanswered.

The report recognized that local

schools were outside the jurisdiction of local government,
but suggested that local government should offer leadership

around which the "community might rally" to insist that
local schools be brought up to date in promoting better

relationships.
Comments on the police situation comprised the

longest part of the report, and several steps were suggested,

including recruitment of Negroes for the force, community
recognition of new recruits, and community support in

finding candidates.

A police community-relations department

and better police training also were suggested.

The report

stated:

We feel that the police may be the unfortunate focus
of all the unsolved race problems and social injustices
that the community has failed to deal with over the
years, and that the department is incapable of coping
with them unless exposed to initial training and in
service training emphasizing human relations, civil
rights, and police community relations.
Dr. Wright reported to the Huntington Commission on

this set of meetings and remarked that while Mr. Glatt had

detailed some long-range plans, the city administration
seemed more interested in short-range activities that would
avert any possible difficulties during the summer.

The

Council had promised to provide a recreation facility in the
vicinity of the A. D. Lewis swimming pool to serve the Negro
community.

There was no radical reordering of the status

46Ibid.

*
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quo, merely gestures to mollify the Negro community and
bring a "cool summer.
Thus the immediate reaction of the City Council to

the report of the State Commission was defensive and

concerned with the situation that summer.

There were riots

in major urban areas and rumors of impending riots circulated
throughout the summer in Huntington.

The rumors became so

prevalent that local Negro leaders denied them and disavowed
implication of the NAACP in any plot to create unrest.

Mr.

Henderson stated that the widespread atmosphere of fear and

distrust was deliberately created and planned by people who

hoped to gain by such a disturbance.

These malicious rumors

and gossip were not originating in the Negro community.
"The NAACP is dedicated to racial progress by peaceful and
dignified means.

.

.

. We have not requested outside help

. and do not intend to do so. ,<48

A similar statement

47 Commission Minutes, July 18, 1967.

48 Huntington Herald-Advertiser, Sunday, July 31, 1967,
pp. 1, 5. The rumors were supposed to have started in many
One account had a busload of agitators headed toward
ways.
town. Mr. Ewing told this interviewer that it proved to be a
busload of Job Corps boys from the center in Ironton, Ohio.
Another story had3 "known agitators" coming into town. Mr.
Ewing said he might have been indirectly responsible for that
rumor since he had met Phil Carter and Pat Austin, former CIP
leaders, at the Huntington airport as he was leaving to attend
a meeting in another city. He talked briefly with them, and
then called Chief Kleinknecht and asked to have them watched.
He also mentioned that they told him they were enroute to
Rochester, New York, so he informed officials of that city
who were also at the meeting that these agitators were bound
for their city.
Interview, March 2, 1971.
Miss Austin and Mr. Carter later held a public
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was made by the Ironton-Lawrence County, Ohio, chapter of

the NAACP.
The spread of this type of rumor is, according to

Neil Smelser, a precipitating factor in the mobilization of
a hostile outburst.

When the rumors assume a threatening

form, danger is indicated.

In the course of racial dis

turbances in American cities, rumors of carloads of armed

Negroes heading toward the disturbance from other cities are
not uncommon.

Smelser writes that "such rumors display all

the components of a hostile belief system—anxiety, general-

ized aggression, and omnipotence--and the attachment, by

short-circuiting, of these generalized elements to specific

persons, places, situations, and events. 4 9

Such rumors were

prevalent in Huntington.

There was also an effort in Huntington to blame the
resulting tension on specific persons and events.

Jack

Darrah headlined an August edition of the Spotlight,

EXTORTION!, and accused Negroes of blackmailing government

leaders in the "greatest protection racket of all time."
There is a threat, he said, that "hell is due to break loose

meeting in Huntington to protest this treatment and the sub
sequent letter from Chief Kleinknecht to the FBI requesting
their dossier which was read into the Congressional Record
by West Virginia Senator Byrd. Letter, Ann M. Adams,
Commission on Human Relations, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to
Carl Glatt, West Virginia Human Rights Commission, October 30,
1967.
49Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New
York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 248.
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if the demands of the ghetto dwellers are not met."

Why

doesn't the moderate Negro leadership back the police and
insist that police shoot to kill rioters?

We must not give

in, he implores, to the demands of the so-called Negro

moderates and their liberal white friends.
Mr. Darrah then explained the police problem, which,
he said, is caused by poor salaries, Supreme Court rulings,

threat of civil rights suits, and the general public dis
regard for cops.

He informed his readers that Herbert

Henderson, the state president of the NAACP was slated to be
the next judge of the Municipal Court.

He went on to quote

unnamed business leaders and members of the police department
in their disgust at this coming appointment.

If this rumor

is not denied, he warns, we can assume that it is based in
fact.50

More racial trouble broke out at Huntington High

School in October.

The Board of Education met with Negro

students to hear a list of demands, including black cheer

leaders and majorettes and the opening of all clubs to any
students that qualified (the same requests taken under

advisement by the Board the proceeding May) .

This time the

5QSpotlight, Vol. II, No. 4, August 25, 1967 .
Similar views were expressed by Senator Byrd in a speech on
the Senate floor in which the urban riots were blamed on lazy
welfare mothers, defiant young hoodlums, and those who have
been given a license to break the law because of their social
or economic condition. He constantly refers to by—gone years
ne worked
wuxked, most people were poor, and no one rioted
when everyone
;
their
condition but worked hard and saved to
to improve
Congressional
Record, July 25, 1967, pp. 20159succeed.
20160.
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Board granted the student requests and a backlash developed

from white students and their parents who objected to opening
the school clubs.

One parent defended the club system as a

good training ground for college campus Greek letter organi—

zations. 51

This decision by the Board of Education caused a

great deal of resentment in the community.

Many parents of

white students perceived the Board as knuckling under to a

small minority that used demands to get its way, and this
feeling caused further deterioration of the already tense
situation.

Less than three weeks later a Fair-Housing Group was
formed which announced it planned to work in the city for

"fair housing legislation and practices.”

The fair housing

issue had already been brought to public attention when the

Huntington Commission had voted to request support from the
Huntington Ministerial Association toward passage of an
open-housing ordinance in the city. 5 3

A similar effort,

concurrently underway in Charleston, West Virginia, was
given much publicity in Huntington. 54

This campaign mobilized

51 Huntington Herald Dispatch, October 4, 1967, pp.
lr

9.
52 Huntington Herald Dispatch, October 20,
1967, P- 13.
53 Huntington Herald Dispatch, October 18,
1967, P. 1.
54 On November 5, the Charleston City Council passed
passed
an open-housing ordinance. After such a^ proposal had failed
at the Council meeting the previous month,j a group of civic
and religious leaders mounted a campaign, including bonfires
and parades, to bring pressure on the City Council to
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another segment of the community to oppose the Commission’s
efforts.

Many people had no children in high school and

thus were unconcerned with school problems; others had no
personal interest in police problems; but everyone lived
somewhere, and most people were concerned with fair housing.
This issue probably mobilized more opposition to the

Commission than any other, for it enabled those opposed to

couch their opposition in terms of property rights and
freedom of choice instead of race.

However, despite the opposition, the choice had’
already been made by City Council to pass the Human Rights

Ordinance.

A proposed draft of the ordinance was reviewed

by the Commission at its September meeting with only minor

changes suggested. J

On October 23, the first reading of

the ordinance was on the Council agenda, with final reading

and a public hearing scheduled for November 14.

already thrashed out specifics of the ordinance.

Council had

It did not

provide the power of subpoena and Council generally felt
that instead of delegating power away from Council, as

opponents claimed, the ordinance served to give Council more
control over the Commission.

reconsider and pass the ordinance. The campaign was colorful
and received much TV and newspaper coverage in the Huntington
area.
^commission Minutes, September 19, 1967. The lead
"An
paragraph in the news report of the meeting reads:
ordinance which would give the Huntington Human Rights
Commission status as an official agency of city government
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The Council had undoubtedly been influenced by the
meetings with the State Commission the previous spring.

It

had also worried through the rumor-filled summer and was
grateful for the work of the Negro leadership in cooling

down some rock-throwing crowds in the 16th Street area.

The

Human Rights Commission ordinance was one area of the State
Commission's recommendations that Council found relatively
easy to enact.

Councilmen recognized the need for communi-

cation with the Negro community and thought the Commission

was still the proper vehicle to discuss and solve problems.

Councilmen also were shaken by the pressure from the State
Commission and had decided they would prefer to have racial

troubles handled by a local group which might be able to
solve problems before they became incidents or events. 56
The meetings with the State Commission had forced the
Council to face the issues and provide reassurance to the

Negro community and the Huntington Commission in order to
avert the threat of racial trouble.

Thus the Council chose

to give symbolic reassurance and nondecision. 57

This

with broad powers to investigate aspects of race bias and
bigotry won tentative approval from Commission members . .
Huntington Advertiser, September 19, 1967, pp. 1, 2.

.

t!

56Transcript of a public meeting on the Human Rights
Ordinance sponsored by the League of Women Voters, March 29,
1968.
57It is also possible to entertain an alternate
explanation of the City Council's action. At the first
consideration of the ordinance in 1966, the Council seemed
to feel that the Commission would become more powerful if the
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reassurance brought counter-action by opponents of the

Commission who organized a petition campaign to bring the

issue to a referendum and then defeat it at the polls.

ordinance were enacted, and thus was reluctant to grant it
more power. The benign neglect did serve to decrease the
Commission’s influence, and it is possible that Council
anticipated this development. When the Council did finally
enact the ordinance giving the Commission status, it could
have deliberately have done so because it knew the Commission
would not become effective because of the anticipated defeat
at referendum. In this case Council would have made a very
real political decision to eliminate the Commission because
the Commission had become an advocate for Negro demands
rather than an agency of nondecision.

I
I
CHAPTER VII

COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION:

THE LINES ARE DRAWN

The community mobilization to fight the enactment of
the ordinance and then defeat it by referendum was carried

out by the Citizens for Better Government, a group of
dissidents including the vigilantes and others distressed at

I

the stance of the Commission or unhappy with City Hall.
This group interpreted the Council nondecision in passing

the ordinance as a decision that affected them adversely;
one that endangered their property and the status quo.

They

mobilized to fight the enactment of the ordinance, and after

its enactment, to defeat it by referendum.^

I
This mobilization for action under conditions of
hostile belief is seen by Neil Smelser as a necessary

^Members of the steering committee included Mrs.
Payne; Mrs. Earl Mosser, another prominent clubwoman; John
Beckwith, owner of the largest grocery in town; John Brothers,
a real estate broker; and Harry F. Thompson, a young lawyer
active in Republican politics and sometime candidate for
public office, who was named chairman. This group began
immediately to gather signatures to force the ordinance to a
referendum vote. The committee’s feat was truly amazing.
Within thirty days of the passage of the ordinance, at the
height of the Christmas season, the group was able to gather
over nine thousand signatures. When a tedious check dis
allowed over one thousand of the names, the committee then
collected another three thousand within ten days. This time
the Council gave in and after only a cursory check put the
issue on the May primary ballot.
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condition of hostile outburst.

According to his theory

these conditions occur when the participants are bent on
attacking someone considered responsible for a disturbing

state of affairs.

Among the factors on which such outbursts

depend are structural conduciveness, structural strain, and

the growth and spread of generalized belief. 2
Smelser analyzes structural conduciveness in

relation to three aspects:

(1) the structure of responsi

bility in situations of strain;

(2) the presence of channels

for expressing grievances; and (3) the possibility of
communicating among the aggrieved. 3

Smelser finds that the structure of responsibility
in a situation of strain in these affairs is clearly

associated with the growth of hostile outbursts.

Under

conditions of tension those perceived to be responsible are
expected to take remedial steps.

In post-disaster

situations, for example, responsibility is usually laid where
people are thought to have the power to alleviate the
conditions that brought the disaster.

This usually results

2Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New
York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 224-26. Actually Smelser
includes six factors in his analysis of collective outbursts.
In addition to those included in this study are the following:
(1) precipitating factors (which release the energies of a
collectivity—the passage of the ordinance by the Council
could be viewed as a precipitant in this study galvanizing
the vigilantes into action); (2) mobilization of participants
for action; and (3) the operation of social control.

3Ibid., p. 227.
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in shifting the blame upward in a hierarchy of authority.

In

conditions of established religious, class, or ethnic cleavages within a community, a group or collectivity is often

assigned responsibility for causing trouble.
according to Smelser,

■t

These cleavagesr

are frequently accompanied by stereo

types and prejudices—generalized attitudes identifying the
despised group and specifying the kinds of threats for which

the group is responsible."

These cleavages and the general

ized attitudes that accompany them, "form a set of struc-

turally conducive conditions for the flow of hostility.

.14

These conditions were present in Huntington during

the ordinance campaign.

The vigilantes blamed their hostile

feelings on a wide variety of groups including the Supreme
Court, City Council, the Black community, "outside agitators"
and communists, as well as the Commission.

But the

Commission was the only group that the vigilantes were able

to attack successfully.

They were joined in their mobiliza-

tion of bias by those afraid of fair housing and others
nostalgic for a past era.

These people, too, had no enemy

they could fight except the Commission.
The second aspect of Smelser's structural

conduciveness involves the presence of channels for expressing
grievances.

This focuses attention on the opportunities for

aggrieved persons to express hostility.

It is dependent on

the availability of alternate avenues of protest, since

4Ibid., pp. 228-31.

I

I
I
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hostile outbursts often occur when there is a closing of
important legitimate avenues of dissent.
!

When there is no

institutionalized means of expressing grievances, there is

often violence.5

This aspect was also operative in

Huntington on two levels:

the first involved the Black

community, which was cut off from the legitimate decision
making arena by the institutionalized nondecision agency,
i

the Commission; the second involved those opposed to the

Human Rights ordinance, who, while they had access to the

Council (the decision-makers) felt they lacked an advocate
in the decision-making channels such as the Black community

had in the Commission.

They felt the Commission blocked

their demands to the Council on this issue.

It was easier

to get rid of the Commission than to impeach the Council;
moreover, most of the community had little quarrel with the

work of the Council except in the area of race relations
where the community felt the issue was not legitimate.
Another group opposed to the passage of the ordinance

was made up of those who disagreed with the community

conservationists and wished to return to another municipal

system—not Council-Manager.
The third aspect of structural conduciveness which

relates to hostile outbursts is the availability of an
adequate medium of communication for spreading the hostile

5jbid., pp. 234-39.
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belief and mobilizing for attack.6

Black churches have

served this role in mobilizing Black masses in the Civil

Rights movement; and this is why Black clergymen, such as

Reverend Smith, are often leaders in such movements.

ACTION

has occasionally filled this role for the Black community;

but the Black leadership in Huntington has been fractured,
and this has diluted their efforts.

In the context of the campaign to mobilize bias
against the ordinance, the Spotlight served as the house

organ.

The Huntington daily press kept the activities of

those involved in the campaign on the front page, so there

was little problem of adequate media coverage.

In the same

way that publicity was the lifeblood of the CIP protest, it
also sustained the campaign against the ordinance.

A member

of the Better Citizens Committee explained the group's

success in terms of its use of the media.

"We gained the

advantage," he said, "while those supporting the ordinance
didn't even think we had a chance to get the signatures to
put the ordinance to referendum." 7

Another medium of

communication that was used effectively in the campaign was
the women's clubs.

These groups had already organized

calling committees and were readily mobilized to serve as
a link between the leadership and those working actively

6Ibid., pp. 249-51.
^Interview, Harry Thompson, June 11, 1971.

I
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to defeat the ordinance.8
On the other hand, part of the problem of those
supporting the ordinance was that they lacked both an
I

I

effective organization and a means of communication.

It was

not until the weekend before the referendum question
I

appeared on the ballot that the newspaper supported the

ordinance editorially.

The opposition made much greater use

of the news media.
<

The only group that tried to mobilize support was

the League of Women Voters, which attempted to reach other

groups but found little success.

The groups with which the

League traditionally allied, the other women's groups and
the men's service clubs, were either working against the

ordinance or had their membership so badly split on the
issue that they were unwilling to get involved.

Although

the Ministerial Association supported the ordinance, as did

several ministers individually, the churches were generally

also divided and despite expressions of support from some

8Mrs. T. Smith Brewer said she felt this effort by
the women's clubs really made the difference in the
referendum effort. She explained the rationale behind the
clubwomen's efforts. Most people in Huntington, she said,
are Christian people and want to be fair, but they resent any
group being given special favors. They are willing for any
man to earn his way. The majority of people in this town,
Negro and white, are good people; they are solid citizens who
own their own homes and are not interested in stirring up
trouble. Good Christian people have their cause in Jesus
Christ, and this is the reason they don't get all wound up in
other causes as the Unitarians do. Communism appeals to
people who don't have a cause like Christ to live for.
Interview, Mrs. T. Smith Brewer, April 19, 1971.
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church governing bodies, the churches generally handled the

issue gingerly, if at all; often holding Sunday evening

discussions of the ordinance, occasionally scheduling a
sermon on the "Good Samaritan" or the Golden Rule.

None of

the efforts in individual churches were coordinated.9
The Commission itself which might have provided some

leadership, disbanded in November after passage of the
ordinance.

The Mayor appointed a new Commission in January

which never met, so this leadership was reduced to the
I

individual member's efforts in his church or civic group.
The City Council, especially Mr. Hinerman, Mr.
Robertson, and Mr. Garner, went on speaking engagements to
discuss the ordinance as often as they were asked.

However,

they weren't asked very often.

The Black community was split and somewhat apathetic
about the ordinance.

Mr. Henderson castigated the ordinance

as a "toothless tiger," useless and worse than nothing. 11

9Mrs. Brewer also spoke about the divisive effects
support of the ordinance had on some major Hunting ton
congregations. First Methodist and Fifth Avenue Baptist
Churches still sustain a schism in their membership dating
to the ordinance effort. This was confirmed in part by George
Sublette, a member at Fifth Avenue Baptist and Baptist campus
pastor, who said that between $20,000 and $30,000 had been
withheld from the local church budget annually since the pas
tor's strong stand favoring the ordinance. Many other mem
bers have since joined other congregations. This is the
congregation to which Mrs. Payne belongs, as well as Judge
Hereford.
Interviews, Mrs. Brewer and George Sublette,
May 6, 1971.

■^Interview, Robert Hinerman, April 7, 1971.
-

L

•^Interview, Herbert Henderson.
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Reverend Smith said Negroes welcomed the referendum campaign

because it served to uncover the "insidious prejudice"
prevalent in the community.

The referendum, he said:

. . . will serve to identify the local bigots who force
responsible Negroes into militant black power camps.
. . . It will provide an opportunity for genuine
responsible whites to refute those who would prostitute
ignorance in order to gain cheap publicity. And it
would also serve the purpose of notifying the white
community that the day of paternalism is over. 12
But this statement is hardly one of support for the ordinance.

The only Black support statement came from a small Negro

sorority.13
Other community support generally came in the form of

a public statement from an organization. 14

Except for the

League efforts and the financial contributions generated by

Robert Emerson, there was little mobilization of support
except symbolically. 15

12 Huntington Advertiser, November 21, 1967, p. 11.
13 Huntington Herald Dispatch, December 9, 1967, P- 12.
14Besides the League and the Negro sorority, support
statements came from the Huntington District Labor Council,
the Greater Huntington Chamber of Commerce, B'nai B'rith and
the Huntington Ministerial Association. The Session
(governing body) of Beverly Hills Presbyterian Church (the
Commission Chairman's church) and the First Presbyterian
Church (the Ministerial Association Chairman's congregation)
also endorsed the ordinance.
15Robert Emerson and his wife, Roberta, were instru
mental in the effort to establish Council-Manager government
in Huntington. Mrs. Emerson agreed to serve on the
Commission when her husband refused, although both remained
interested in civil rights problems. Mr. Emerson is an
attorney and spearheaded the financial support for the League
of Women Voters' efforts as well as speaking in behalf of the
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There was greater mobilization of opposition than
mobilization of support for the ordinance.

This was partly

the result of greater effort by the opposition and partly

because of the natural advantage enjoyed by the status quo

in such situations.

It is always easier to block decisions

than it is to initiater enactt and implement them.
Smelser also considers the conditions of strain that

underlie hostile outbursts.

Such conditions can be institu

tionalized to follow cleavages in society such as the labor

management or Negro-white dichotomy.

Such strains, then,

are built into the social situation and combine with stereotypes that assign responsibility for evil to other groups.
This combination is apt to precipitate hostile outbursts.

1 zr

Economic or political pressure from Blacks often
threatens established norms such as the color line, and

heightens structural tension between the two groups.

In such

cases hostility tends to focus on a particular issue as it
.
17
did in Huntington.

Police brutality became the mobilization

cry for the Black community while the dangers of the

Commission ordinance and the threat of open housing were

combined to provide the focus for white hostility.

Smelser

shows how such strains often result from real or threatened

ordinance. Mrs. Emerson was very active in the League during
the Council-Manager campaign. They can both be classed as
community conservationists.

■^Smelser, p. 241.

17Ibid., p. 243.
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deprivation.

White dissidents in Huntington saw their norms

and position in the decision-making system threatened by the
ordinance, and they lacked reassurance from the decision

makers.

In fact, Council passage of the ordinance in the

face of their opposition violated their concepts of legiti
macy .

Unlike the vigilante group and its supporting

coalition r the Blacks were faced with actual, rather than

imagined, deprivation in their social, economic, and
political life.

They, too, were denied even symbolic

reassurances by Council, for the ordinance as finally

passed suffered from the rising expectations of the Black

community, who saw it as too little for their needs.

The

community conservationists were concerned about system

maintenance and wished to mollify Black demands as well as
encourage the realization of their ideals of equal opportunity for all.

A situation of strain, therefore, was

clearly present in Huntington at this time.

The growth and spread of generalized belief,
Smelser's third factor, was precipitated in Huntington by

the riot rumors, the fair-housing efforts, the racial

trouble in the schools, and the police-Commission conflict.
Black hostility was generated by the pervasive discrimination

in the community, the rising expectations of Blacks due to
national legal and legislative gains, the lack of adequate

means to express and redress grievances, as well as the
frustration they engendered, symbolized in the street
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incidents and the generalized hatred of the police.

These precipitating facts served to confirm or

justify existing generalized fears or hatreds.

Rock

throwing in black neighborhoods brought police repression.
Police actions encouraged additional animosity from the

Negro community.
the other.

Each group fulfilled the expectation of

Failure of protest actions to achieve any long-

term results may also precipitate hostile outbursts. 18

The mobilization for action on the part of those
opposing the ordinance in Huntington was swift and successful.

The Citizens for Better Government was able to use preI

i

existing structure—women’s clubsr the Spotlight, the police

department, church and civic groups—to supply the energy

for the mobilization campaign.

They thus accomplished their

objective by direct intervention in the decision-making

system.
The defeated ordinance proponents accepted the

decision.

The community conservationists were committed to

work within the existing decision-making channels.

Their

primary concern was system maintenance and methods outside
the normal decision-making channels were unacceptable to
them.

The Black community, already excluded from the

decision-making channels, was unable to generate support for
protest activities.

The ordinance did not rank very high on

their list of priorities.

l^Ibid.t p. 249.

The social controls which had
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institutionalized the legitimate grievance channels remained
operative for both Blacks and whites.

Neither opponents

nor proponents were willing to use mobilization methods

outside prevailing norms.
The decision at the polls was considered by all

parties to be legitimate and was not challanged by the City

Council, the Black community or the community conservationists.20

Moreover, their present opinion, three years

later, still considers the ordinance defeat a valid
expression of community feeling.

There are no plans at the

present time (1971) to push for a reorientation of community

norms and biases in the area of race relations.

l

19lbid., P- 261.

20 The ordinance lost by a vote of 2-1, overall, and
passed by a few votes in only seven out of a total of eightyfive precincts.

I
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CHAPTER VIII
HUNTINGTON AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

AN EVALUATION

It has been the contention of this study that the
Human Rights Commission in Huntington (1962-1967) served as

a barrier to decision-making in city government on questions

II

of race relations and civil rights.

Such a commission has

been seen as designed to deflect decisional questions away

from City Council so that they might be settled outside the

II

actual policy structure in an informal manner.

A human

rights commission is generally considered a positive policy
maker , a way to deal with problems of discrimination, when

actually such a commission may merely serve as an insti

tutionalized nondecision agency, a barrier to the real arena
of policy choice, a part of the status quo maintenance system.
Part of this nondecision structure is built into a

council-manager form of city government.

Whether as a result

of the ethos philosophy of its middle-class leadership or
merely as an unintended result of the structure itself, it
does seem that a commission unable to make policy makes
nondecisions instead.

It has been argued that there are parameters based
on community norms and biases that limit the kinds of
questions considered legitimate for policy consideration.

In Huntington, between 1962 and 1968, Black grievances were
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not a matter of community concern.

What did concern the

community was the threat of militant action on the part
of disadvantaged Blacks, and so both material and

symbolic efforts were undertaken by policy-making agents

only in response to a protest from groups outside the
normal channels to policy-makers.

The CIP group at

Marshall and the Huntington High students used picketing
and other high visibility methods to make grievances

more visible to a community that would have preferred to
ignore them.
As a community, Huntington professed belief in
equality of opportunity while actively pursuing
discriminatory practices.

By publicizing the gap between

theory and practice, such groups as the CIP and the

Commission were able to alter the prevailing bias of city
government and a part of the community so that, in a

small way, both material and symbolic efforts could be

undertaken to widen the opportunities for Black citizens.
Employment opportunities were enlarged, particularly in
entry jobs.

While these opportunities often merely

encouraged tokenism, in a city with such a small black
population and a previous pattern of great discrimination,

even tokenism served to widen opportunity.

Public

accommodations were opened, partly as a result of Federal
and state legislation but also partly as a result of

local efforts which altered prevailing community norms.

Discrimination was no longer accepted public practice.
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It is a fact of the Civil Rights movement that
sympathetic white groups have not often altered prevailing

community norms significantly.

Change has usually come from

Black protest efforts, which, in Lipsky’s terms, activate

reference publics (third parties) to influence public policy

in behalf of Blacks.

These reference groups such as the

Huntington Human Rights Commission, seek to influence policy

outputs for a variety of reasons, but usually only in

response to protest group action which serves to provide the
reference groups with leverage to press for protest group

demands.
i

i

Without such demands a group such as the Huntington

Commission cannot mediate, and mediation is what it was set

up for.
Change in this kind of environment comes only in
response to a threat.

Policy leaders are willing to permit

change in order to preserve the system and maintain

equilibrium.

Leaders must balance competing demands for

change only to preserve the larger system from destructive

trends since the status quo exerts great influence toward

inertia.
In this situation the leadership will usually
attempt symbolic policy outputs designed to reassure the
reference public and the protest group without actually

changing the system output at all.

This was seen most

clearly in Huntington in the Marshall University reactions
to the continuing charges of discrimination on the campus.

The fraternities and sororities at Marshall were not the

r
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only source of discrimination on the campus, but their

members served to symbolize the system.

Charges of

discrimination against the Greek system served to deflect

demands from the wider problem of discrimination on the

campus and in the community.

The police-Black community

problems fall in the same category.

Whether the police

mistreatment of Blacks is real or not, the reaction
against police methods serves to channel community
energies into an area that does not involve the

community as a whole or even the whole of city govern

ment .
Co-optation of Black leadership was another non
decision strategy which was followed in Huntington, both in

naming some Black leaders to the Commission and in the advent

of the Federal poverty program which usurped the energies of
the remaining Black leadership.

This left the already non

militant Black community with no leadership to present
I

demands and grievances, no way in which to act.

The Commu

nity Action program in Huntington served not as a way for
disadvantaged groups to gain power to influence local policy,

but instead served to channel demands through this framework

to the Federal government.

The Black leadership felt that

the Federal programs offered both symbolic and material

benefits to the Black population.

This program co-opted the

leadership so that after 1966 and the Keith Albee incident,
the only agitation for concessions from local decision-making

t
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agencies or the Commission itself came from young people in

school situations, on complaints in the area of police

harassment.

The rock-throwing incidents in Black neighbor

hoods are the Huntington equivalent of an urban riot, serving
as symbolic expressions of Black rage against white power and
authority.

Especially since the defeat of the Human Rights

ordinance, Blacks in Huntington see little reason to try
channeling their demands through local government.

They

have undertaken to push the school board on school
desegregation and have forced the closing of Barnett, an
1

all Black elementary school; they have been provided with a

token allotment system of admittance to other (largely
white) schools.

With no system of transportation provided,

this has resulted in transfer privileges used mainly by

middle-class blacks who can provide transportation for their
elementary-aged children.

Even this small accomplishment

was gained only after a march on the school board offices by
Blacks plus the filing of a court suit charging segregation.
It seems there is no change in the status quo without some

sort of overt demand except when it benefits the system to
change rather than oppose change.

Another problem encountered in Huntington has

involved charges of tokenism.

There have been recent attempts

on the part of the city government to offer what it considered
real concessions to the Black community.

The best example of

this was the appointment of a Black dentist, Dr. Thomas B.

1
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Wright, to fill an unexpired term on the City Council from
.I

the district in which most of the Black community live.
This professional-level Black family had recently moved to
an upper-middle-class white neighborhood, and the Council

i i

members felt fortunate that the district lines included his
neighborhood as well as the Black ghetto.

This evoked

little public comment in the white community, but there have
been "Uncle Tom" and tokenism charges from the Black

community.

There is a real question whether Dr. Wright will

choose to stand for election to Council.

The first move

would come from the All-Huntington Association who would
have to offer him a place in the slate, and there is then no
assurance he could be elected in an at-large election for

Council.
A volunteer group has partially replaced the Human

Rights Commission in providing education and symbolic
reassurance.

The Cabell County Human Relations Council has

concentrated on providing reassurance to the Black community
that there are members of the white community who are
concerned, still, about discrimination and equal opportunity.

It also provides a face-to-face meeting place for racially

mixed groups, still not a natural occurrence in Huntington.
The Council has undertaken production of a play for
presentation to church groups and other communitv n-rgev—

zations depicting some of the problems of Blacks in a white
world.

This kind of effort is still somewhat radical

147

Huntington, and so the Council is performing a much needed

community service in this context.
Neither Black leaders nor present members of City

Council see a re-activation of a Human Rights Commission by

the City Council.

Council members still nurse their wounds

on the issue, and the Black community no longer thinks this

kind of Commission would meet their needs adequately.
The same people that provided the opposition to the

Human Rights ordinance continue to provide opposition to

liberal or radical ideas.

Mrs. Payne and various

conservative church leaders regularly oppose radical or
liberal speakers on the University campus; they tried to

prevent Ralph Ginzberg, Herbert Aptheker, and Bishop James
Pike from appearing at the student sponsored Impact week.
There is a former Cuban refugee, the wife of a doctor, who

lectured to many civic groups about the Communist menace.
not only in Cuba but in West Virginia and particularly at

Marshall University, "where everyone knows" there are
Communists on the faculty.

Neither Black leaders nor

Council members feel that there has been much change in
attitude in Huntington in the area of race relations.
At this time there seems to be little effort by the

Black community to exert demands on the city government and

no active reference group to speak in their behalf.

The

ordinance campaign effectively relegated Black grievances to

a position outside the decision-making channels of local
government, and any changes come by way of Federal and state
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government.

Although there is no longer any institutionalized

agency of nondecision to deal with questions of human rights
and discrimination; the prevailing community norms and biases

seem to be effective in preventing any entry of such
questions to the policy-making channels of local government.
What the ordinance defeat did accomplish was to destroy the
one reference public that protest might influence.

Although

the community is probably more open today than it was in
1962, there is no longer any organized group to listen to the
powerless Black population and articulate their demands and
grievances.

This has left the Black community with little

chance to make demands on local government and has made the
efforts toward change one way, from city government to the

Black community with no way for feedback to occur.
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I

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Information was gathered for this paper primarily

through personal interviews of one to four hours in length
of several people involved in the Huntington Human Rights
Commission during the period it was active in Huntington.

Names were obtained by the reference method with one person
recommending interviews in turn with others.

The three

chairmen as well as the two secretaries of the Commission

were interviewed.

Mr. Robert Hinerman, Mr. Edward Ewing,

and Mr. George Garner, all actively involved in city govern

ment during the time of the Commission, were interviewed.
Mr. Herbert Henderson was interviewed for his perspective on

the impact of the Commission and its role in relation to

that of the NAACP in which he has been active, currently
serving as state president.

An attempt was made to interview Mrs. E. Wyatt Payne,

the most active and articulate member of the opposition to

the Commission ordinance, but efforts to set up an interview
were unsuccessful over a four-month period.

Mrs. Payne

broke one interview appointment, and then suggested an

attempt to interview Mr. Harry Thompson, who was the official
chairman of the group.

Mr. Thompson was interviewed, but he

acknowledged that he did not become involved until after the

ordinance had already been passed by Council.
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possible to secure a tape of an interview with Mrs. Payne
justifying her stand on the ordinance for a production of

WMUL Radio, aired a week before the ordinance vote.

In an

interview, Mrs. T. Smith Brewer, a well-known and respected

Huntington clubwoman, was able to give her side of the
ordinance opposition effort.

The minutes of the Commission from the city files on
the work of the Commission were available.

Mrs. Harmony

Phillips, the last Secretary of the Commission, kept a well-

organized and complete file of minutes, correspondence, and
pertinent clippings which proved invaluable.

Dr. Royce

McDonald and Dr. Paul Stewart, former Commission Chairmen,

also opened their personal files for this research.

Mrs.

C. M. Gray, a regular and persistent newspaper clipper lent

her boxes of articles on the work of the Commission.
Many other persons indicated interest and offered
insights and information that led to the right person or

other source of information.

Without this kind of help, it

would have been impossible to gather the information and

opinions that are the basic research of this study.
The original intention was to do an analysis of an

opinion questionnaire of racial attitudes of the persons
interviewed.

Questionnaires were either taken at the time

of the interview or left with a stamped-addressed envelope.
A follow-up mailing was sent to those who had not returned
the questionnaire by the time the interviews were completed

(four months after the beginning of the period), enclosing

i

I
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another questionnaire, an explanatory letter, and another
stamped envelope.

The problem with this effort was the

necessity of an almost 100 percent response in order to

achieve any kind of meaningful statistical relevance since
the number of cases was so small.

While responses were

generally good, several key people, including key Black
leaders and both Mr. Thompson and Mrs. Payne did not return

the questionnaires .

All the replies received, except that

from Mrs. Brewer, were from persons on the same side of the
ordinance campaign; and while they indicate slight
differences in reasons for action, they are basically very
similar.

The only difference that seems significant is that

members of City Council or the city administration did not

concur in the general statement that police brutality does

exist in Huntington, while the majority of those who are not
city officials did agree that it exists.

Because of this

one-sided response, a more complete analysis of these

questionnaires was ommited from the study.
guide is included in Appendix B.

The interview

II
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Interview Outline
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i

INTERVIEW OUTLINE

1.

2.

3.

Background:

a.

Historically, what groups or forces have governed
Huntington politically and socially?

b.

How would you characterize the politics of the
community?
(Style, Republicans v. Democrats, what
groups make up each party?) What groups have
dominated the non-partisan city elections? Who
forms the opposition? Is there actual inter-group
competition for political power locally? What is
the traditional role of Negroes in community
political life?

c.

What were the facts of discrimination in terms of
employment, schools, housing, and so on?

Human Rights Commission:
a.

What led to the formation of a Mayor’s Commission on
Human Rights?

b.

What kind of work did it do?

c.

What issues came before it?

d.

How did it handle the problems brought before it?

e.

How effective was it?

f.

Were there outside influences that affected the role
it was able to play?

g.

What was the attitude of the community at large
toward the Commission? The black community? City
government?

The ordinance:
a.

What led to the desire for the Commission to be set
up by ordinance instead of just by executive order?

b.

What was the goal of those seeking to have.this
ordinance enacted?

c.

From where did the opposition come?
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d.
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Why was there opposition?
Was it all local?

Were there outside influences?
e.

What was the role of the Commission in the ordinance
vote?

f.

What was the role of City Council?
Other parts of city government?

g.

Was there any coordination of effort to defeat the
ordinance?

h.

Any coordination of effort to defeat the referendum?
What techniques were used by both proponents and
opponents?

j•

4.

The election:

a.
5.

What techniques seemed to have the best results?

An analysis of the election returns

The aftermath of the referendum:

a.

Where do you think Huntington is now in its race
relations?

b.

Do you think the whole ordinance campaign had any
effect?

c.

Are conditions any better for Negroes now in
Huntington? Why? Local efforts? Outside push?

d.

What is the present view of Negroes now toward city
government?

e.

Will Council consider some revival of the Human
Rights Commission?

f.

What is the view of city hall toward Negro rights?

MARSHALL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Manuscript Theses

Unpublished theses submitted for the Master’s Degree and
deposited in the Marshall University Library are open for
inspection, but are to be used only with due regard to the
rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be
noted, but passages may be copied only with permission of
the authors, and proper credit must be given in subsequent
written or published work.

This thesis has been used by the following persons, whose
signatures attest their acceptance of the above restrictions.
A Library which borrows this thesis for use by its patrons
is expected to secure the signature of each user.

Name

Address

Date

